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Clark: Curable Ills of the Criminal Law of Florida

CURABLE ILLS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF FLORIDA
VMENON W. ClARK*
INThODUCIMON

On March 18, 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,' dramatically focusing the
attention of the nation on one of the technical shortcomings of the
criminal law of Florida. This momentous decision established that
due process of law under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States requires the State to furnish counsel for an
indigent defendant it charges with the commission of a non-capital
2
felony.
The inadequacy of the law of Florida revealed by Gideon was not
obvious to the legalist prior to the decision. The right to court-appointed counsel has long been recognized in this state as resting with
an indigent defendant charged with a capital offense.3 In non-capital
cases, however, neither Florida 4 nor federal standards of due process
of law 5 previously accorded him this right unless he could demonstrate
that he could not obtain a fair trial without the assistance of counsel
because of the gravity of the offense, his immaturity, mental incapacity, lack of education or inexperience with legal processes. Consequently, no statutory provision had been made to supply counsel for
other than insolvent defendants in capital cases.
The existence of the sin of omission uncovered by this decision
was no surprising revelation, however. For years public-spirited attorneys recognized and attempted to meet this pressing social need
by serving as uncompensated counsel for indigent defendants in noncapital cases, often at an appreciable personal sacrifice. Defendant
*A.B.E. 1982, University of Florida; M.A. 1939, New York University; LL.B.
1941, University of Florida; Author of numerous articles on criminal law in
Florida; Member, Criminal Law Committee, Florida Bar; Professor of Law, University of Florida.
A table of headings and subheadings is appended at the end of this article.
1. 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
2. There is doubt whether this case should be cited as applying to misdemeanors; the majority opinion contains no reference to the distinction between
felonies and misdemeanors, the term "crime" being used exclusively. Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion, particularly, creates doubt as to the scope of the
majority holding.
3. FA. STAT. §909.21 (1961).
4. Johnson v. State, 148 Fla. 510, 4 So. 2d 671 (1941); Watson v. State,
142 Fla. 218, 194 So. 640 (1940).
5. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
[258]
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Gideon's failure to receive the benefit of such service, while initially
unfortunate, ultimately produced unprecedented constitutional advantages for him and for all defendants similarly situated.
Within two months of the advent of this newly-recognized constitutional right of indigent defendants, the legislature of Florida authorized the establishment of the elective office of Public Defender in
each of the sixteen judicial circuits of the state, these officers to be
charged with the responsibility of upholding this new right. 6 The initial financial support provided for the mammoth task of representing a
class of defendants that is comprised of approximately fifty per cent
of all persons charged with crime may prove inadequate. Adjustments, no doubt, will be necessary in many respects, but satisfaction
lies in the fact that one ill of the criminal law of Florida, although by
no means cured, is receiving remedial treatment.
The ensuing discussion is concerned with other imperfections of
this comprehensive segment of public law. These debilities are found
primarily in the technical nature of the present substantive and procedural law of this state. None of them may require its counterpart
of Gideon for alleviation, yet some are potentially as grave as the one
treated there. They run the gamut of the law, from the incipiency of
the crime to post-conviction processes. All need corrective attention.
Space does not permit the written consideration to which each
item is entitled. An effort has been made, however, with every turn
of the legal kaleidoscope, to properly orient the reader and, simultaneously, to lay the basis for practical recommendations.
CLASSxrMC TIONS OF CRMES

Felony-Misdemeanor Distinction
Section 25, article XVI of the Florida Constitution and Florida
Statute 775.08 provide that a felony is any criminal offense which is
punishable by death or imprisonment in the state penitentiary. By
judicial construction this classification of crime also includes any crime
specifically designated as a felony by the legislature regardless of the
penalty provision. 7 All other criminal offenses are misdemeanors.8
It seems apparent that the hypothesis underlying the classifications of crimes in Florida is that a felony should be considered to be a
more serious offense than a misdemeanor. Substantiation of this assumption is found in an impressive array of Florida statutes. Examples of the deference accorded a felony as being the more reprehen6. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-409.
7. Nation v. State, 154 Fla. 337, 17 So. 2d 521 (1944).
8. FLA. STAT. §775.08 (1961).
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sible criminal offense are laws concerned with habitual criminals, 9 the
jurisdiction of criminal courts when juveniles stand accused, 10 compounding felonies,"- criminal homicides committed while perpetrating
or attempting other crimes, 12 justifiable homicide,'13 loss of civil rights

upon conviction,' 4 arrests with or without a warrant, 15 restricting the
disclosure of the return of an indictment, 16 and specifying the number
of peremptory challenges in the selection of a petit jury. 17 Yet, an
undesirable anomaly exists in the law.
The determination of the relative seriousness of offenses by the
designation of the place of imprisonment, as distinguished from the
maximum period of imprisonment, is unrealistic and conducive to legislative arbitrariness and injustice. Under the present classification of
crimes the legislature is free to provide the same or even a greater
maximum period of imprisonment for a misdemeanor than for a felony
merely by omitting, purposely or by inadvertence, to specify the place
of imprisonment or by designating that it be the county jail, a misdemeanor in either case. 18 Accordingly, there is provided in many
felony and misdemeanor statutes the same maximum period of imprisonment of one year.19 The ludicrous legality of the anomaly created by Florida classifications was given deplorable emphasis when
the legislature set the maximum period of imprisonment in one misdemeanor statute at five years. 20 Such constitutional latitude for legislative arbitrariness is highly undesirable.
The basic criterion differentiating a non-capital felony from a misdemeanor in federal law and in some states, 2' as well as that provided
in the American Law Institutes Model Criminal Code,22 is the maximum period of imprisonment. Under federal law a crime that is punishable by death or imprisonment exceeding one year is a felony.2 3 All
9. FLA. STAT. §§775.09, .10 (1961).
10. FLA.STAT. §39.02 (1961).

11. FLA.STAT. §843.14 (1961).

12. FLA. STAT. §§782.04,.11 (1961).
13. FLA. STAT. §782.02. (1961).
14. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§97.041(4), (5) (suffrage); 99.021, 112.01, 876.25(1),
(2) (right to hold office); 40.01(2), .07 (right to serve as a juror) (1961).
15.

FLA. STAT.

16. FLA.

STAT.

§§251.18(2), 901.14, 901.19 (1961).

§905.26 (1961).

17. FLA.STAT. §913.08 (1961).

18.

FLA. STAT. §§775.06, .08 (1961).
19. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§795.01, 797.02, 817.16, 832.01, 104.40 (felonies);
788.02, 784.05, 796.01, 821.23 (misdemeanors) (1961).
20. FLA. STAT. §548.01 (1961).

21. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §6 (1961).
22. MODEL PENAL CODE §1.04 (1962).
23. 18 U.S.C. §1 (1958); see also FLA. STAT. §941.14 (1961), in which
Florida presently employs this time distinction in a phase of its extradition proceedings.
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other federal offenses are misdemeanors. 24 This manner of classifying
crimes is far superior to that of Florida because of its inherent consistency with the proper conception of the relative severity of the two
types of crimes. The comparable seriousness of the two classifications
is immediately recognized in their definitions. This is not true in
Florida.
The validity of this conclusion is reinforced by an ironical move
which the legislature of Florida found to be necessary in 1959 with
reference to the place of imprisonment for the commission of a felony.
Dictated by economics and the rapid growth of the prison population the legislature provided: 'Whenever punishment by imprisonment is prescribed, and said imprisonment is by statute expressly directed to be in a state prison, the court may, in its discretion in all
cases where the sentence imposed is for a term of five years or less,
direct that the imprisonment be in a county jail ... ."25 Here the present definition of a felony in Florida sadly lacked the capacity to pass
the test of practicality.
Another situation emphasizing the inferior character of Florida's
classifications eventually will be presented to the courts in view of the
Gideon decision. The Supreme Court of the United States was concerned with an indigent defendant charged with a felony under Florida law. The opinion leaves much to speculation concerning the applicability of the holding to indigent defendants in misdemeanor
cases. If the Court tacitly assumed that a single felony is ipso facto a
more serious crime than a misdemeanor, it either was placing an unjustifiable emphasis on the mere term "felony" or was erroneously assuming that a felony was in fact a more serious crime, as it is under
federal law and in many states. Since the exact coverage of Gideon is
doubtful, an indigent defendant charged with the Florida misdemeanor punishable by a maximum imprisonment of five years should
present an interesting situation when he demands as a constitutional
right to be furnished defense counsel at public expense.
Desirable reform of the inconsistent and unfair penalty provisions
of many criminal statutes of Florida requires a basic operating principle in order to achieve fairness. Such a principle is found in a constitutional classification of crimes which forms a base for a systematic
approach to penalty provisions formulated on the relative seriousness
of criminal acts. Accordingly, it is recommended that section 25, article XVI of the Constitution and Florida Statute 775.08, be amended
to provide that a felony is any criminal offense made punishable by
death or imprisonment exceeding one year. All other crimes should
24. Ibid.
25.

FLA. STAT.

§922.051 (1961).
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be considered misdemeanors. The present judicial recognition of the
legislative authority to ignore the definitions of the classifications by
specifically designating a particular act a misdemeanor or felony
should be expressly negatived. The legislature should be given no
such discretion; the recommended definitions of the classifications are
sufliciently broad for the legislative judgment to be amply exercised.
The granting of greater latitude leads to confusion and inconsistency
in the law.
AMENDMENT AND

REPEAL OF STATUTES

DEFINING CRIMES

Abortion
Therapeutic Abortions. According to section 797.01, whoever
with intent to procure miscarriage of any woman unlawfully administers to her, or advises or prescribes for her, or causes to be taken by
her, any poison, drug, medicine or other noxious thing, or unlawfully
uses any instrument or other means whatever with like intent, the
woman not dying from such activity, commits a felony. Since the
statute is couched in terms of unlawful acts, a logical deduction may
be that in appropriate situations the mere acts specified in the statute
might be free of illegality.
An act that otherwise would be a criminal abortion is justified as a
matter of common law if it is necessary to preserve the life of the
woman.2 6 Even if not so justified it is excused if done by one acting in
the good-faith belief of such necessity, provided such belief is based
upon reasonable grounds.27 While the statute has been held applicable
to a victim who was not pregnant,2 8 and thus penalizes an attempt to
procure as well as the procuring of an abortion, a reasonable assumption appears to be that the statute will be construed in the light of the
common law. The trend outside Florida with reference to abortion
statutes is in this direction.2 9 Whether or not this assumption is correct, the statute should be amended to definitize the law with reference
to abortions falling outside its limits. Such an amendment should include the specific recognition of the common-law principle that an
abortion is lawful if necessary to preserve the life of the woman. In
addition, express provision should be made for a reasonable and goodfaith belief of such necessity as a valid defense, as well as the proceState v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928).
27. Ibid.
28. Weightnovel v. State, 46 Fla. 1, 85 So. 856 (1903); Eggart v. State,
40 Fla. 527, 25 So. 144 (1898).
29. E.g., Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 815 Mass. 394, 53 N.E.2d 4 (1944);
State v. Dunldebarger, 208 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928); Beasley v. People,
89 111. 571 (1878).
26.
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dure for establishing this belief. Leaving such items for judicial determination results in needless delay.
The development of medical science and the availability of
trained personnel competent to determine the necessity or apparent
necessity for abortions dictate that the defendant's latitude in establishing his defense should be allowed only within clearly defined limitations. It is therefore recommended that a lawful abortion be
spelled out in the statute as one that is necessary to preserve the life
of the woman or is performed upon the advice of two physicians as
being necessary for this purpose. A similar provision currently ap30
pears in the Florida manslaughter statute concerned with abortions
and in the abortion statutes of other states. 3 '
Pregnancyby Rape or Incest. Two types of "therapeutic" abortions
should be legalized by specific exemption from the application of section 797.01. The specified acts should not be deemed criminal when
knowingly performed for the benefit of a female who, as a victim of
the capital crime of rape, has been made pregnant, and for the benefit
of an unmarried female under the age of fourteen years who is pregnant as a result of incestuous sexual intercourse.
A female who has been the object of forcible rape and made pregnant thereby should not be required under the law to suffer the ignominy of involuntarily giving birth to a child under circumstances with
reference to which she stands faultless. One illustration may serve to
solidify this position. A reputable physician in a Florida city called
to inquire concerning the possible legal courses of action with reference to a girl fourteen years of age who at that time sat with her
parents in his office pleading that an abortion be performed. The
pregnancy, according to the physician, was caused by the rape of the
girl by four males of another race. The physician was of the conviction that the child would suffer no physical jeopardy by childbirth.
Florida law at present demands, by omission, that the unfortunate
child shall bear the unjust burden for life. Humanitarianism demands
that an abortion law be not so exacting as to be a vehicle of injustice.
The same position may be taken with regard to an unmarried female under fourteen years of age who has become pregnant by an
incestuous sexual act. In order for the act to be incestuous it must
be committed by a male and a female who are prohibited from marrying because of designated close family relationships. 32 This act usually
is by the mutual consent of the parties, but such mutuality is not indispensable to the commission of incest, as was demonstrated in Flor30.

FLA. STAT.

31. E.g., Wis.
82.

FLA. STAT.

§782.10 (1961).
§940.04 (1955);
§§741.21, .22 (1961).

STAT.

GA. CODE
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ida by a father's sexual act with his twelve-year-old daughter to which
the daughter did not resist because of his overpowering influence
33
upon her.
Whether or not the unmarried female under fourteen consents to
the incestuous sex act should be considered immaterial. Children under this age are accorded great deference under the juvenile laws of
Florida.3 4 With few exceptions their conduct is not measured by
standards of adult behavior. Unless they are indicted by a grand jury
for a capital offense or a crime punishable by life imprisonment, they
cannot be tried in a criminal court of Florida in the absence of their
voluntary waiver of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.3 5 The preferred status of this age group, already well established, constitutes
the basis for the designation of the fourteenth birthday as the maximum limit under the proposed law. A higher limit must await a
more substantial base upon which to rest.
Although the juvenile law applies to married as well as unmarried
juveniles,3 6 a married female is excluded from the proposed "therapeutie" abortion law. Such an exclusion would cause no difficulty for a
female who is pregnant by virtue of an incestuous marriage. All incestuous marriages should be expressly stated to be absolutely null
and void for purposes of this statute.3 7 The female, therefore, would
be considered as unmarried. In the event the female was validly
married" at the time she became pregnant by an incestuous relationship, she should not be entitled to the compassion of the law which
forms the philosophical basis for the proposed statute.
Implementation of Recommendations. The attempt to implement
a principle will often illustrate its weaknesses. It appears necessary,
therefore, to offer suggestions to facilitate the effective operation of
the recommendations concerning the legalization of abortions in rape
and incestuous situations as previously discussed.
An abortion or attempted abortion in either of these situations
should be legal only with the written consent of a circuit court issued
33. McCaskill v. State, 55 Fla. 117, 45 So. 843 (1908).

84.
35.
36.

FLA.STAT. ch. 39 (1961).
FLA.STAT. §89.02(6) (1961).
FLA. STAT. §39.01(6) (1961).

37. There is a question concerning whether an incestuous marriage under
present Florida law is void or voidable. The term "void" is used in FLA. STAT.
§741.22 (1961), but in a civil case the Supreme Court of Florida apparently
considered such a marriage as voidable. Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511,
189 So. 666 (1939). No criminal case has been appealed in Florida on this
issue.
38. See FLA. STAT. §741.06 (1961), which apparently contemplates the
possibility of such a marriage.
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to one or more licensed medical doctors who apply to the court for
permission to perform such an abortion.
This consent should be preceded by, and be the result of, a civil
proceeding wherein the circuit judge conducts a hearing to determine
whether rape or incest has been committed and whether pregnancy
has resulted therefrom.
Such a hearing should be closed to the public and initiated either
by the court or the female involved. The power of subpoena should
be granted to assure the attendance of witnesses.
The male accused by the female of causing the pregnancy should
not be amenable to the aforementioned subpoena power; he should
not be required to be present at the hearing nor to testify at any
time in this civil matter.
The court's decisions should be governed by the preponderance of
the evidence produced at the hearing, as in other civil cases.
In no event should the record of this hearing be admissible as evidence in a criminal prosecution of any person for rape, incest or any
other crime allegedly based on the sexual relationship under investigation.
These suggestions are offered for the purpose of assuring that a
legal abortion may be performed expeditiously, since time often is of
the essence in such situations. Privacy and the minimizing of embarrassment to the female and those persons with whom she is intimately
associated are taken into account. Finally, the rights of the potential
defendant in a subsequent criminal prosecution are protected, leaving
the prosecution unaffected by the civil proceeding.
Statutory Rape
The term "statutory rape," although not used by the legislature of
Florida as a technical designation of a crime, is generally understood
to refer to the statute entitled "Carnal intercourse with unmarried person under eighteen," a non-capital felony.3 9 The term has been used
in this sense on the appellate level in Florida. 40
This statute provides, inter alia, that the crime is committed by
any person who has unlawful carnal intercourse with any unmarried
person, of previous chaste character, who at the time of such intercourse is under the age of eighteen years. As originally enacted only
males could be prosecuted. 41 By amendment in 1921, however, the
terminology presently in the law was added, thus including females as
89. FLA. STAT. §794.05 (1961).
40. Pittman v. State, 47 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1950); Stanley v. State, 124 So.
2d 748 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
41. Fla. Laws 1887, cb. 8760.
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potential defendants.42 Although the statute provides that a victim of
this crime must be under eighteen years of age, there is no mention of
age regarding a defendant. An interesting question thus arises concerning whether the defendant must be at least eighteen years of age.
The language of the law, construed literally, establishes no such line
of demarcation. Yet, unless this division is recognized complexities
are created.
Hypothetical inquiry may be of assistance in determining the legislative intent in this matter. Did the legislature intend that in the
event both male and female are unmarried, of previous chaste character, and under eighteen years of age, both could be prosecuted?
An affirmative answer would create an undesirable inconsistency in
the law. Young and previously innocent persons thus would be subject to conviction of a serious felony punishable by a maximum period
of imprisonment of ten years or by a maximum fine of two thousand
dollars. 43 On the other hand, these same persons upon reaching their
eighteenth birthday, by the same conduct, would commit only the
relatively mild misdemeanor of fornication which is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum period of three months or a fine not to exceed thirty dollars. 44 Since the statutory rape legislation originated
many years after that of fornication, comparison of the maximum penalties is of substantial significance in determining legislative intent.
Another helpful supposition may be posed regarding these two
young people. If only one of them is to be considered as the perpetrator and the other considered to be the victim, who should bear
the stigma of the criminal? Lest one be inclined to place the onus on
the male, the debility of such a position is apparent when considered
with regard to the possibility of sexual intercourse by a female of seventeen years of age with a male of ten years, the valid consent of the
male being obtained by the initiation and aggressiveness of the female. The construction of the statute to the effect that such a male
should be prosecuted as the sole defendant would amount to an undesirable reflection on legislative intelligence.
No appellate court of Florida has been presented the issue of the
minimum age of the defendant. The Supreme Court of Florida, however, has indicated that the basic purpose of the statute is the protection of immature persons from licentiousness 45 and inferred that this
protection is required against older, designing persons,4 6 although no
minimum age was specified.
42. Fla. Laws 1921, ch. 8596, at 421.

43. FLA. STAT. §794.05 (1961).
44. FLA. STAT. §798.03 (1961).
45. Simmons v. State, 10 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1942).
46. Blount v. State, 102 Fla. 1100, 138 So. 2 (1931).
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This position is consistent with the common sense the legislature
may be presumed to have exercised in this matter; otherwise the law
could be the basis for the conviction of one of the classifications of
persons it was designed to protect. The statute should be amended
to specifically set the minimum age of the defendant at eighteen
years.
A 1961 amendment to this section is expressed in terminology that
creates doubt as to the legislative intent. A subsection was added
47
providing:
It shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that
the prosecuting witness was not of previous chaste character at
the time of the act when lack of previous chaste character in
the prosecuting witness was caused solely by previous intercourse between the defendant and the prosecuting witness.
The word "solely" in this statute creates perplexities. It seems obvious that the chastity of the prosecuting witness can be destroyed
only once and that, of necessity, it can be destroyed in no manner
other than "solely" by the person first having sexual intercourse with
the prosecuting witness. This vaguely-expressed amendment may
have contemplated the availability of a defense to the defendant in
the event of the alleged victim's voluntary and unlawful sexual intercourse with another intervening between defendant's chastity-destroying intercourse and the act for which he is on trial. Regardless of
whether the statute requires court construction or necessitates amending to assure this defense, the following amended version is recommended:
It shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that
the prosecuting witness was not of previous chaste character at
the time of the act when the lack of previous chaste character
in the prosecuting witness was caused by previous intercourse
between the defendant and the prosecuting witness and the prosecuting witness has experienced no other voluntary, unlawful sexual
intercourse prior to the act for which the defendant is being tried.
Solicitation of Legal Services
The 1959 Florida legislature condemned as a misdemeanor the intentional stirring up of strife and litigation by (1) giving, promising,
or offering something of value or conspiring so to do, or (2) solicit-

47.

FLA. STAT.

§794.05(2) (1961).
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ing, receiving or conspiring to solicit or receive something of value. 48
The propriety of such legislation can hardly be questioned in the light
of the need for a well-ordered and tranquil society.
During the same legislative session additional law in this province
was enacted which is not so worthy of commendation. In an elaborate statute, section 877.02, the solicitation of legal business was made
punishable as a misdemeanor. In spite of its broad language there is
little question that a major purpose underlying this statute is the protection of the Florida Bar from certain undesirable activities of some
of its members and their associates.
At the risk of incurring the wrath of the writer's brethren of the
Bar, the position is taken that this statute violates the basic principle
warranting the designation of an act as a crime. "A crime is any act
or omission prohibited by public law for the protection of the public,
and made punishable by the state in a judicial proceeding in its own
name."4 9 There is little doubt that such activity adversely affects the
public in some respects, but little imagination is required to contemplate equal or greater jeopardy to the public welfare in many other
professional and business areas which are equally entitled to protection under the criminal law. To attempt to render such protection by
virtue of additional criminal statutes and their enforcement would
make obvious the significant fact that the criminal law should be used
for the protection of society only in those cases in which other recourses are not available.
The solicitation of legal business by a lawyer, either directly or indirectly, is considered as unethical, for which he may be disbarred
from the profession. 50 Expediency of state criminal action and the
tremendous expense incident thereto are not justified merely to serve
the convenience of a profession in policing its own members, particularly a profession which takes pride in the fact that it is an integrated
unit with the judicial system of the state as its guardian of acceptable
professional conduct. 1
The 1959 legislature by enlisting the sanctions of the criminal law
to prevent the intentional stirring up of strife and litigation served the
public well, but unfortunately misused those same sanctions in making criminal the solicitation of legal business. Section 877.02 should
be repealed.

48.

FLA. STAT.

§877.01 (1961).

49. CLAm &MARSHALL, CamRus 79 (5th ed. 1952).
50. Fla. Bar Integration R., art. XI(1).
51. Fla. Bar Integration R., Preamble.
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A number of Florida criminal statutes formerly of prime importance in the substantive law area have been rendered nullities by court
decision or subsequent legislation. Through legislative oversight, apathy or unjustifiable caution, these statutes remain on the statute books
and contribute substantially to confusion in the law. A discussion of
this legislation may serve to emphasize the desirability of its repeal.
Bribery
Until 1955, sections 838.01 and 838.02 were the general Florida
statutes specifying the substance and penalties for the crimes of giving and accepting bribes. In that year, however, the enactment of
sections 838.011, 838.012 and 838.013, not only completely covered
the substantive scope of their predecessors, but proscribed as criminal
many acts not previously condemned in the statutory treatment of
bribery. In addition to this enlargement there are material differences between the penalty provisions of the two sets of statutes. Beyond question, therefore, the older statutes have been superseded by
the 1955 sections and should be expressly repealed.
Conspiracy
Section 833.01, a general conspiracy statute, was enacted in its
original form in 1868.52 Until 1957 this statute remained legislatively
inviolate in spite of prolonged and widespread criticism of the comparatively light maximum penalties provided for its violation, namely
imprisonment of one year and a fine of five hundred dollars. In that
year, however, sections 833.03, 833.04 and 833.05, were passed which,
in effect, split the substantive aspects of this statute into three parts
based upon the legislative consideration of the severity of the conspiracies involved. Maximum penalties consistent with the comparative seriousness of the situations were provided.
Even though the 1957 sections in their composite form varied little
from section 833.01, except with reference to penalty provisions, the
legislature did not see fit to expressly repeal the earlier statute. Thus,
it became necessary in 1959 for one of the Florida district courts of
appeal to point out clearly that section 833.01 has been superseded by
sections 833.03, 833.04 and 833.05. 53 Confusion, error and delay will
result by leaving section 833.01 on the statute books. It should be expressly repealed.
52. Fla. Laws 1868, ch. 1637.
53. Bazarte v. State, 114 So. 2d 500 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
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However, all may not be well with the general conspiracy law
even if section 833.01 should be repealed. In section 833.05 one of
the objects of the proscribed agreement is to "commit any act injurious
to the public health or public morals, or for the prevention or obstruction of justice... ." Substantially the same language appeared in a
Utah statute under consideration by the United States Supreme Court.
The Court pointed out that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires that a criminal statute give adequate guidance to a
defendant of the offense with which he is charged, and that such statutory terminology standing alone failed to give such guidance, but
that possibly it might be supported by proper construction. 54 The case
was remanded to the Utah Supreme Court for further consideration in
the light of this opinion and was there held void for vagueness and
uncertainty under the fourteenth amendment. 55
The California Supreme Court, after calling attention to its full
consideration of the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Utah case, upheld the statutory terminology "to pervert
or obstruct justice" as meeting the requirements of due process. 56 The
Florida statutory counterpart, "the prevention or obstruction of justice," seems equally clear.
The term which is particularly vulnerable to attack on grounds of
due process of law is "to commit any act injurious to .. .public
morals." Rather than perpetuate the open invitation to litigation inherent in this part of the statute, this terminology should be deleted
from the section.
Embezzlement
Prior to 1951 the crimes of embezzlement, larceny, and obtaining
property by false pretenses were treated as distinct crimes in separate
general statutes. 57 In that year, however, section 811.021 was enacted
which, by its terminology, was obviously to combine in one statute,
designated as 'larceny," these three crimes. The general statutes providing for embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses
were not expressly repealed, however.
This legislative omission led to inexcusable confusion of long duration. After five years the Supreme Court of Florida, largely upon its
own initiative, took advantage of an opportunity to hold that the 1951
larceny statute had superseded the statute on obtaining property by
54. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
55. State v. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193 (1950).
56. Calhoun v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 18, 291 P.2d 474 (1955).
57. Fla. Laws 1903, ch. 5160, §1; Fla. Laws 1921, ch. 8563, §§1, 2; Fla.
Laws 1868, oh. 1637, §50.
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false pretenses.5 8 The Florida legislature of 1957 took cognizance of
this action and expressly repealed the superseded statute.5 9
Unfortunately the appellate courts of Florida have not had a similar opportunity to repudiate the general statute on embezzlement.
This is not surprising since no doubt the situations which prior to 1951
were prosecuted as embezzlement under the general embezzlement
statute, section 812.04, are now prosecuted as larceny under section
811.021. It seems, therefore, that the task of removing the general
embezzlement section from the statute books of Florida must be assumed by the legislature without judicial prodding. Section 812.04
should be expressly repealed.
UNCONSTrrTONAL STATUTES PURPORTING TO DFFnqE Cmis

Criminal Communism
In 1941 sections 876.01 through 876.04 were enacted under which
criminal anarchy, criminal communism, criminal naziism and criminal
fascism were considered as doctrines embracing activities directed
toward the violent overthrow of the governments of the United States
and Florida. The advocacy of any of these doctrines was penalized
as a felony. In 1953 sections 876.22 and 876.23 were enacted which
classified as felonies, and set various criminal and civil penalties therefor, activities of a subversive nature directed toward the violent or
otherwise unlawful overthrow of the constitutional forms of government of the United States, the state or any political subdivision of
either.
In 1956 the Supreme Court of the United States, in Pennsylvaniav.
Nelson,60 ruled that a state law designed to impose a criminal penalty
for seditious activity directed toward the violent overthrow of the federal government was an illegal infringement of an area that had been
preempted by federal legislation. The result of this holding was the
nullification of the pertinent laws of forty-two states, including Florida. This massive nullification apparently did not distress the Court,
particularly with reference to Florida's section 876.02(5). This statute
was cited as illustrative of the ultimate in severity and impropriety in
state legislation since it purported to punish mere membership in subversive organizations, in contrast to federal legislation that provided
no penalty if federal registration requirements were followed.
For three years following Nelson there was doubt concerning
whether this ruling invalidated state legislation penalizing subversive
58. Anglin v. Mayo, 88 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1956).
59. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-1, at 1.
60. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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activities directed exclusively toward the violent overthrow of a state
government.
or local government, as distinguished from the federal
62
6l
During this period the appellate courts of Michigan and Kentucky
indicated that the prohibitions of Nelson were all-inclusive. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts while deciding that, because
of Nelson, an indictment charging advocacy of the violent overthrow
of the government of Massachusetts would have to be quashed, expressed the reservation that there could be some kinds of sedition
directed so exclusively against the state as to fall outside the scope of
63
Nelson.
The Supreme Court of Florida apparently was the first state appellate court to unequivocally hold that Nelson did not apply to subversive activity directed toward the violent overthrow of state or local
governments. In a commendable spirit of independence bolstered by
a careful study of the Nelson opinion, the Florida Supreme Court
rendered a decision in 195764 and another in 195965 enunciating this
position. This judicial perspicacity paid dividends in the latter year
when the Supreme Court of the United States rendered a similar
decision. 66
The net result of this ramified sequence of legislative and judicial
events is the invalidity of the Florida legislation penalizing activities
directed toward the violent overthrow of the federal government.
Sections 876.01, 876.02, 876.22 and 876.23 should be amended accordingly; the appropriate changes in these sections should render unnecessary any changes in the remaining sections.
The United States Supreme Court forced another change in the
law of Florida concerned with subversion. In 1949 section 876.05 was
enacted requiring all candidates for public office and all employees of
the state of Florida and various sub-divisions and departments thereof
to take an oath in the following form:
, a citizen of the State of Florida and of the
I
United States of America, and being employed by or an officer
and a recipient of public
of
funds as such employee or officer, do hereby solemnly swear
or affirm that I will support the Constitution of the United
States and of the State of Florida; that I am not a member of
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
1958).
66.

Albertson v. Millard, 345 Mich. 519, 77 N.W.2d 104 (1956).
Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. App. 1956).
Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 334 Mass. 71, 134 N.E.2d 13 (1956).
State v. Diez, 97 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1957).
Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 108 So. 2d 729 (Fla.
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1963

15

CURABLE
ILLSVol. 16, Iss. 2 [1963], Art. 7
Florida
Law Review,

the Communist Party; that I have not and will not lend my
aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist
Party; that I do not believe in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of Florida by force
or violence; that I am not a member of any organization or
party which believes in or teaches, directly or indirectly, the
overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the
State of Florida by force or violence....
The Supreme Court of Florida upheld this statute upon two occasions against various attacks, including the contention that it was invalidated by the Nelson decision. This contention was not acceptable
to the court, since it felt Nelson did not prohibit regulation of items
properly falling within the police power of the state, such as the setting of a reasonable condition as a prerequisite to public employ67
ment.
In 1961 the Supreme Court of the United States was presented
this "loyalty oath" statute for its consideration.6" No fault was found
with the Florida court's attitude with reference to the effect of Nelson
on the statutory oath, but the two supreme courts were in crucial
disagreement on another point. The Florida Supreme Court previously had refuted to its satisfaction the contention that the statute was
so vague that it failed to meet requirements of due process of law,
stating that "there could be no doubt in the minds of anyone who can
read English as to the requirements of the statute and the effect of a
failure to comply." 9
The Supreme Court of the United States rebutted this blunt observation by designating certain language of the statute as being so am70
biguous in its coverage that it violated constitutional requirements.
The terminology, "that I have not and will not lend my aid, support,
advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party . . ." was considered so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and might differ as to its application; this use of
words, therefore, was condemned.
Upon the case being remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida
for appropriate action, the court decided that the statute could stand
as a complete legislative enactment in spite of the omission. The remainder expressed a complete legislative requirement; the principle
67. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, 125 So. 2d 554
(Fla. 1960); State v. Diez, 97 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1957).
68. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, 368 U.S. 278

(1961).
69. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, supra note 67,
at 558.
70. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, supra note 68.
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was recognized that the unconstitutionality of a portion of a statute
will not necessarily invalidate the entire act. 71 The judicially condemned terminology has never been removed from section 876.05.
The legislature should delete it.
Sunday Closing Laws
Since 1951 when the legislature amended two of Florida's more
comprehensive Sunday closing laws to exclude additional businesses,
thus allowing them to operate on Sunday, the Supreme Court of this
state has frustrated every attempt to legislate in this area. The criminal statutes amended in 1951, sections 855.01 and 855.02, were declared unconstitutional in 1952.72 The 1955 legislature reenacted these
sections in the form in which they appeared prior to the 1951 amendments. This effort was in turn nullified in 1957 by the Florida Supreme Court, these more restricted versions being ruled as violative of
73
constitutional guaranties.
In 1959 the legislature made another attempt, this time confined
to the civil field and more limited in coverage. Civil procedures and
penalties were provided in section 320.272 directed toward prohibiting the sale or exchange of new or used motor vehicles on Sunday.
Meticulous effort was exerted in the preparation of this legislation to
meet every possible objection based on constitutional grounds. The
proscribed activities were not limited to Sunday; New Year's Day, the
Fourth of July, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas were also specified.
Supplementing this precaution against more abortive legislation, a
lengthy preamble, in which the legislative intent was carefully clarified, preceded the body of the statute. In spite of this painstaking
care the statute was declared unconstitutional in 1960. 74
One may wonder why hope springs eternal in the legislative breast
that acceptable Sunday closing laws may be enacted. The answer lies
in the judicial determination that this is possible. The Supreme
Courts of Florida and the United States have held that a properlydrawn Sunday closing law may be based on the police power of the
state and is not in violation of the constitutional guaranty of the separation of church and state.75
The major stumbling block to attaining a valid law is the pressure
for unwarranted exemptions from its operation. The inability of the
71. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, 137 So. 2d 828
(FLL 1962).
72. Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952).
73. Kelly v. Blackburn, 95 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1957).
74. Moore v. Thompson, 126 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1960).
75. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Henderson v. Antonacci,
62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952).
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Supreme Court of Florida to justifiably distinguish between some of
the businesses accorded exemption, and some not so favored, was the
primary reason for twice invalidating sections 855.01 and 855.02. This
unjustified distinction in the statutes, in the court's opinion, was inconsistent with the proper exercise of the sovereigns police power.76
Proper classffications can be drawn, however, as was recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in 1961 when it upheld Sunday
9
78
closing laws of Pennsylvania, 77 Massachusetts, and Maryland.7
A comparison of the opinions of the Supreme Court of Florida with
those of the Supreme Court of the United States reveals a more liberal attitude on the part of the latter toward the state legislative differentiations of businesses in these laws. An apt example of the Florida court's attitude of strict construction is found in its invalidation of
the previously discussed section 320.272, concerned with sales of motor
vehicles on Sunday and other designated days. In so doing the court
conceded that the business of selling motor vehicles, as the sole object
of Sunday closing legislation, has been upheld as a legitimate classification by the majority of state courts that have been confronted with
the issue. The court assumed its minority membership with the comment that the upholding of such a statute would be inconsistent with
the public policy of this state.8 0
The position of the Florida Supreme Court apparently has not
deterred further legislative endeavors in this field, although without
satisfactory results. A portion of the 1963 session of the Florida legislature was assigned to a non-productive consumption of time and
expense in dealing with the complex question of exempt classflications. The widely divergent opinions of legislators foiled sincere efforts to resolve the problem."'
One is led to wonder whether the time has arrived for the legislature to abandon its efforts to govern this area of human behavior. Regardless of whether the future course is that of abandonment or continuation, however, there is one step that should be taken at the first
opportunity. The three Florida statutes that have been declared unconstitutional in such an unequivocal fashion should be expressly repealed. There is no valid reason why they should remain on the statute books of this state.
76. Henderson v. Antonacc, supra note 75.
77. Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
78. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617

(1961).
79. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
80. Moore v. Thompson, 126 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1961).
81. See Tampa Tribune, June 1, 1963, p. 6.
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ABoLmoN OF THE OFFICE OF CONSTABLE

Section 6, article VIII, and section 11(1), article V of the Consti-

tution of Florida should be amended to eliminate the office of constable. These sections provide for the election of a constable by the
registered voters of each justice of the peace district to perform such
duties as may be prescribed by law.
While the office of constable may have served a useful purpose in
the past, there is little doubt that with the modem police agencies of
the state, county, and metropolitan levels of Florida, the one-man
elective office of constable, calling for no pertinent qualifications of its
incumbent, is an unwarranted duplication of police protection, as well
as a stumbling block to an efficiently integrated system of law enforcement. The present statutory duties of the constable which are of miscellaneous nature8 2 can either be eliminated or absorbed by the office
of the sheriff. These sections should be amended to accomplish this
end.
SELECnON OF THE AssisTANT STATE ATrONEY

Section 27.21 provides that assistant state attorneys shall be appointed by the Governor with the consent of the state Senate. By virtue of practical politics this requirement assures the near omnipotence
of a senator in making such appointments within his district. Such a
system has little to commend it. The state attorney, an elected official, 88 is responsible for criminal prosecutions in his circuit. He is
entitled to, and needs, all of the cooperation he can obtain in the difficult task of prosecuting criminals.
The present system facilitates appointments based primarily on
political favoritism rather than on professional qualifications.

It pro-

vides an undesirable independence of a subordinate official in dealing
with significant matters for which he often cannot be held responsible
by his superior officer. Its success is a matter of chance. The statute
should be repealed and the state attorney given the authority to appoint his own assistants.

PRE nuAAND

TkRAL PRoCEURE

Delay in Taking Arrestee Before Magistrate
Florida statutes 4 require that a person arrested either with or without a warrant of arrest be taken before a magistrate without unneces82. See FLA. CONST. art. V, §11(3); FLA. STAT. §37.18 (1961).
83. FLA. STAT. §§27.01, .02 (1961).

84. FLA. STAT. §§901.06, .23 (1961).
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sary delay. The Supreme Court of Florida has been disturbed by the
lack of concern law enforcement officers have displayed for this statutory requirement. Illustrative of the situations giving rise to this concern was the case of a Florida defendant who was put in jail on June 2
and "held for investigation of manslaughter;" he was questioned intermittently until June 11, when he confessed; thirteen days later, on
June 24, he was taken before a magistrate for the first time. Apparently he was allowed to see no one except police officers during this
entire period.8 5 The court was convinced by other evidence that the
confession was voluntarily given and thus was admissible as evidence
at the trial despite the delay in taking the arrestee before a magistrate. Even though this was true, the court felt impelled to sound a
warning against such police methods. Attention was called to the fact
that the Attorney General of Florida had warned law enforcement
officers of the obligation placed upon them by Florida law. A continuation of these procedures was considered as being certain to result
in either voluntary or federally-forced adoption in Florida of a rule
similar to the federal McNabb-Mallory rule, rendering illegal the evidentiary fruits of such activities.88
Present statutory and case law of Florida encourages rather than
discourages such unconscionable acts on the part of the police. The
statutory requirement of taking the arrestee before a committing magistrate "without unnecessary delay" not only is bereft of provision for
its enforcement, but is so lacking in specificity that it is an open invitation to actions prejudicial to the arrestee. In addition, the Supreme
Court's present position to the effect that the failure of the officer to
comply with the requirement does not necessarily result in the deprivation of the rights of the defendant, if other facts support the convic7
tion, creates an atmosphere of condonation of such activity.
Judicial warnings buried in written opinions will have no more,
and probably will have less, alleviating effect on the seriousness of this
situation than the cautionary statements of the Attorney General and
the mandate of the statutes. Practicalities of law enforcement contribute materially to the difficulty of the problem, but unless it is
solved on the state level the ominous note of federal participation
sounded by the Supreme Court of Florida is likely to become a reality.
There seems little reason to doubt that the concept of an expanding
fourteenth amendment favoring the defendant, 88 presently embraced
85. Milton v. Cochran, 147 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1962).
86. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). See Orfield, Confessions of Federal Criminal Defendants, in this Symposium.
87. Simmons v. State, 132 So. 2d 235 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
88. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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by the Supreme Court of the United States, furnishes an adequate
basis for the federal courts to dictate this phase of Florida law. It
behooves the people of this state to take the initiative in seeking the
solution.
A procedure deemed adequate to meet this problem should be
devised to accomplish two objectives, (1) the reduction to a minimum
of such police activity, and (2) the achievement of fairness to both the
defendant and the State in those instances in which the activity occurs. Deficiencies in the capacity to attain these objectives appear in
both the Florida and federal procedures.
There are no sanctions in the Florida law to deter the delay of an
officer in taking an arrestee before a committing magistrate. The federal procedure deters him to the extent that he knows his delay is
considered as tantamount to illegal activity directed at obtaining evidence from the arrestee, thus rendering it inadmissible at trial. The
comparative merit of this procedure is diluted by the fact that it operates regardless of whether the defendant has suffered actual prejudice
by the delay.
At present it seems inadvisable that Florida should abandon its
practice of determining whether the events occurring during the delay
have adversely affected the defendant's rights. Before repudiating
this time and expense-conserving procedure an effort should be made
to minimize the number of delays.
A practical approach to attaining this objective in Florida is difficult, but until the individual law enforcement officer feels that he will
be held personally responsible for an unreasonable delay, this type of
activity will continue. The law should be as specific as possible in the
designation of the time within which the officer is required to take the
arrestee before a magistrate. It also should be definite as to the consequences in the event of his unjustifiable failure to do so.
In order to achieve these goals the Florida statutes should be
amended to provide the following: (1) Any law enforcement officer,
after making an arrest, is required to take the arrestee before a committing magistrate during the first six daylight hours of the period of
the arrest. For purposes of this statute daylight hours begin at 9:00
a.m. and end at 5:00 p.m. as recognized in the county in which the
arrest is made. Sundays and legal holidays that are designated in the
Appellate Rules of the Supreme Court of Florida are excepted from
the operation of the statute. (2) Unreasonable failure to adhere to
this requirement by a law enforcement officer is considered to be in
the nature of an indirect civil contempt of court for which either the
committing magistrate or the court having jurisdiction to try the arrestee may enter a judgment for money damages against the officer in
favor of the arrestee, in an amount not to exceed fifty dollars for each
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hour or major fraction thereof adjudged to be unwarranted delay.
Any officer, even though not the arresting officer, who contributes substantially to the unreasonable delay shall be amenable to the aforementioned penalty. (3) The proceedings provided herein, both original and appellate, shall be the same as those followed in trials of indirect civil contempts of court. The arrestee shall be given due notice
of his rights granted hereunder by the magistrate or trial court as soon
as possible after such rights are determined to have been established.
(4) In no case shall the unreasonable delay by an officer in taling an
arrestee before a committing magistrate, or the rendition of a judgment for damages in pursuance thereof, render inadmissible any item
offered as evidence at the trial of the arrestee.
Transfer of juveniles to Criminal Court
Juvenile courts in Florida have exclusive original jurisdiction over
every child who violates the criminal laws of this state, regardless of
the seriousness of the offense. s9 These courts are not criminal courts
and have no power to adjudicate guilt of a crime. 90 They were established to substitute for retributive punishment proper methods of correction and rehabilitation of children, and to assure that a child removed by the court from the control of the child's parent shall receive
care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which
should have been given to the child by the parent.91 This concept is
embodied in the doctrine of parens patriae in which the state is as92
sumed to have inherent power to provide protection for its minors.
In certain cases, however, the legislature has recognized as desirable the waiver of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in favor of a
criminal court. The juvenile judge, in his discretion, may transfer to
the proper criminal court any child who is brought into juvenile court
as a delinquent child, who is fourteen years of age or older, and who,
if an adult, would be charged with violation of law constituting a felony. 93 The transfer is mandatory if the felony is a capital offense and
the child is at least sixteen years of age. 94 Another non-discretionary
transfer is required in the event that any child, irrespective of age, is
indicted by a grand jury for an offense that is punishable by death or
life imprisonment in the case of an adult violator. 95 These transfers are
consistent with the state's responsibility for determining at what point
89. FLA.STAT. §39.02(1) (1961).
90. FLA.STAT. §39.10(3) (1961).
91. F... STAT. §89.20 (1961).

92. In re Mary Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 871 (1915).
93. FLA. STAT. §39.02(6) (1961).

94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
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criminal procedure should supplant juvenile court procedure in serving the best interests of the child and society.
The one remaining situation cognizable under Florida law for juvenile court transfers cannot be reconciled with the philosophy underlying the creation of the present system of juvenile courts. If any child
is brought into juvenile court as a delinquent child and who, if an
adult, would be charged with a violation of the laws of Florida, so
demands prior to or at the commencement of the hearing before the
court, the juvenile judge is required to waive jurisdiction and certify
the case to the proper criminal court.9 6 The absurd inconsistency of
establishing a court system for the care of minors who, by virtue of
age, are deemed incapable of caring for themselves and, in the same
law, permitting the juvenile to completely frustrate the accomplishment of this commendable objective by exercising his immature judgment in demanding the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction, is obvious. The child's action reduces parens patriae to a mockery. The
criminal courts of Florida should not be obligated to entertain criminal
prosecutions upon the whim of a child. His power to demand waiver
of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court should be eliminated from the
law.
Habeas Corpus
The statutory law of Florida purporting to govern habeas corpus
procedure is in dire need of revision. Chapter 79, which deals exclusively with this subject, has become largely outdated by a comparatively recent amendment of the Constitution of Florida and the adoption by the Supreme Court of Florida of court rules governing a large
segment of habeas corpus procedure. In 1956 the Constitution was
amended to authorize the establishment of three district courts of
appeal. These courts were empowered to issue writs of habeas corpus. 97 The Supreme Court has specified the procedure to be followed
in all original proceedings in habeas corpus in that court and the district courts of appeal. 98 In addition, the court has promulgated Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, providing that collateral post-conviction
attacks on sentences must be by a newly-devised motion for relief as a
prerequisite to the use of habeas corpus in all cases in which the motion is applicable under the Rule. The court also has issued a rule
requiring that all appellate review be by appeal except where certiorari is permitted by law or court rule. 99 All of these developments are
inconsistent with Chapter 79.
96. Ibid.
97. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, §5(3).
98. FLA. APP. R. 4.5(a), ().
99. FLA. App. R. 3.1.
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A number of Florida statutes not included in Chapter 79 also are
concerned with procedural aspects of habeas corpus, 100 but with possibly one exception they all seem to lie outside the scope of the recently
developed law; consequently, they are omitted from this discussion.
The section that is subject to question is 31.06, which provides that
costs in habeas corpus shall be paid by the party applying for the writ
in case he is not discharged from the arrest and imprisonment complained of. Excepted from this requirement is a person furnishing
proof that he has insufficient property or means to pay costs. Such a
statute, with reference to a prisoner in a criminal cause, seems to violate section 7 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Florida providing, inter alia, that the writ of habeas corpus shall be
granted speedily and of right, freely and without cost. The Supreme
Court of Florida, in its Appellate Rules, lends strength to this position
by stating that the payment of costs shall not be required in original
habeas corpus proceedings brought in that court or any district court
of appeal, or in appeals therefrom, arising out of or in connection with
criminal causes or convictions.' 0 ' Section 31.06 therefore appears to
stand in need of an amendment that eliminates the requirement of
payment of costs insofar as it applies to a person imprisoned in a criminal cause or by virtue of a criminal conviction.
Discovery
Elsewhere in this Symposium appears an extensive treatment of
discovery.' 0 2 In order to circumvent needless repetition the observations here will be largely in terms of conclusions upon which recommendations are based.
Discovery is one of the most controversial segments of criminal
procedure law. Efforts to bring about an extension of this procedural
process usually are on behalf of the defendant in order to increase his
sources of material with which to bolster his defense. Opposition to
this advantage to the defense is manifold. The defendant's constitutional protection against self-incrimination, with its consequent lack of
reciprocity between defense and prosecution in exchanging information, heads the list of bulwarks blocking the way to the authorization
of a broader use of discovery. Supplementing this objection are the
State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequisite to
conviction, the legal presumption of the defendant's innocence, the
increased opportunity for the defense to be based on perjury and
100. FLA.

STAT.

§§27.06, 47.10, 909.04, .22 (1961).

101. FLA. ApP. R.2.1(b)(6), 2.2(b)(6).

102. Datz, Discovery in Criminal Procedure.
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manufactured evidence, the facilitating of the intimidation of witnesses, and the possibility of a fishing expedition into the State's files,
confidences and work product.
The attack upon the merits of these objections is equally diverse.
Advocates for a more comprehensive discovery procedure point to
allegedly unfair advantages possessed by the prosecution over the
defense. Among these are the assistance of efficient and expensive
police organizations in securing evidence, and the prosecutor's initial
advantage gained by entry into the case prior to the retention of
defense counsel. The perpetuation of very limited discovery, it is
argued, is characterized by an inherent danger of convictions of innocent persons. In addition, the fear that broadening of the process will
produce perjury and unfair dealing is not justified in the light of the
experience with the successful system of elaborate discovery in civil
cases. Finally, the prosecution is accused of self-serving motives in
seeking to retain the status quo. By keeping the defense in the dark
concerning the evidence, an increase in the number of guilty pleas can
be expected or, in the event of a trial, the chance for conviction is
improved. Thus, the prosecution unjustifiably places a premium on
conviction, rather than justice, as the objective in a criminal trial.
The reasons given in support of the opposing positions are impressive. Merit does not rest exclusively with either position. Implicit in
the controversy, however, is the need of a discovery procedure more
closely geared to the protection of human rights and the achievement
of justice by expeditious ascertainment of the truth. Any system
which encourages opportunities for trial by ambush and unfair advantages gained by surprise, an undue emphasis on winning, a castigation
of all defense attorneys as potential parties to perjury, and which is conin
ducive to the relegation of justice to a secondary role, has no place
10 3
an enlightened society. States slowly are awakening to this fact.
Although there is no common law right to discovery, 0 4 the Supreme Court of Florida, in 1912, recognized that this power lies in the
wise discretion of the trial court.10 5 This position is in accord with the
general holding in this country.' 0 6 It is not surprising, therefore, to
find that trends toward greater discovery in Florida have evolved primarily by court decision, rather than by legislation or court rule.10 7
103. E.g., Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959);
Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957); People v.
D'Andrea, 195 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1960).
104. The King v. Holland, 4 D. & E. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792).
105. Padgett v. State, 64 Fla. 889, 59 So. 946 (1912).
106. See DeGrandpre, The Bases for Pre-TDal Discovery in Criminal Cases,

21

Mo"r. L. REv. 189 (1960).

107. E.g., State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101, 370 P.2d 261 (1962);
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This state, however, is one of the few that also has used statutory
enlargement to a significant degree,1 0 8 albeit judicial construction of
such legislation has been characterized by strictness rather than
09
liberality.
Florida's need in this area is a comprehensive, formalized program
of liberal discovery. Court rule is better adapted to meet this need
than either case or statutory law, both of which are more likely to be
piecemeal and cumbersome. Underlying the rule should be the premise that discovery is designed for the benefit of both parties to the
litigation. The defendant, in addition to receiving appropriate information, should be required to reveal every pertinent item consistent
with his constitutional protection against self-incrimination. The State
should be accorded the privilege of not revealing the identity of confidential informers except when they appear as witnesses at the trial.
The promulgation of a rule that, in any substantial manner, liberalizes discovery will meet able, conscientious and, to some extent, meritorious opposition. Practicalities may dictate a limited extension of
the procedure with a more extensive treatment awaiting education
born of experience with this extension. The classification of some
items as discoverable may be more vulnerable to logical objection than
others, but this should not deter the Florida Supreme Court from
inaugurating its process of selectivity.
Temporary Assignment of Judges
According to section 2, article V, Constitution of Florida, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida is vested with the authority
temporarily to assign judges of one court to serve on another court.
This power is to be exercised in accordance with the specifications of
the section and rules of the court. These rules appear in Part II of the
Florida Appellate Rules and delineate the procedure to be followed in
the assignment of a judge to temporarily perform the duties of another judge unable to act because of disqualification or other disability.
The implementation of this constitutional authorization has led to
confusion, because prior thereto temporary assignment of judges was
governed by statute. These statutes remain on the books. In 1961
the Supreme Court of Florida expressly held that one of these stat108.

FLA. STAT.

§909.18 (1961).

Petition, 894 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958); State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d
100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959).
109. 118 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1959); Minton v. State, 107 So. 2d 148 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1958); see 18 U. FL.A. L. REv. 242 (1960).
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utes, section 37.22, had been superseded by the court rules. 110 Section
38.09, which vests in the Governor the power to designate the successor to a judge disqualified from hearing a particular cause, will suffer
the same fate if the Supreme Court is presented the appropriate issue.
Both of these statutes should be repealed.
Disqualification of Witness by Perjury Conviction
Section 90.07 provides that a conviction of perjury shall make any
person incompetent to testify in any court in this state, even if such
person has been pardoned. This is the remnant of the common-law
disqualification as a witness of any person convicted of crime." 1 Evidence of the conviction of any crime, except perjury, may be given as
affecting the credibility of the witness, but does not serve to disqualify
It seems that in retaining a conviction of perjury as a basis of disqualification as a witness, the Florida legislature was motivated by the
thought that once a person violated the sanctity of an oath in a judicial proceeding he could no longer be trusted to tell the truth in a
court in this state, and that the threat of his being rendered incompetent as a witness would serve as a deterrent to departing the ways of
veracity.
Probably both of these assumptions are acceptable with reference
to isolated cases, but as general propositions upon which to base a segment of the law of a state they are indefensible. Legislative and judicial developments in other states support this conclusion.
The legislatures of almost every jurisdiction have long ago either
entirely abolished or narrowly restricted the disqualification as a witness by conviction of crime."13 Those that saw fit to eliminate the disqualification appear to have adopted the wiser course. Those utilizing the restricted disqualification usually retained the common-law
rule only with reference to perjury, including subornation of perjury. 1 4 In these states the courts have been faced with embarrassing
questions involving logic and policy.
With reference to the question of whether a person previously suffering a conviction of perjury should be allowed to be a witness in his
own behalf, the majority of courts facing the question have confined
their application to persons convicted of perjury within the courts of
the particular state imposing the disqualification."r5 Consequently,
110. State v. Robinson, 182 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1961).
111. See Lefcourt v. Streit, 91 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1957).

112.

FLA. STAT.

§90.08 (1961).

113. Lefcourt v. Streit, 91 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1957).
114. Ibid.

115. Ibid.
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persons convicted of perjury in another state or in a federal court, even
though the federal court is located in the state of the court of the
forum, are not affected by the disqualification statute.
In a case of first impression, 16 the Florida Supreme Court in 1957
adopted a similar position. The court was impressed with the fact
that the number of courts previously adopting this position warranted
it being considered the general rule and acceptable as Florida law.
Recognition was accorded the fact, however, that no single basis for
the rule prevailed; public policy, legislative intent and the principle
requiring strict construction of penal statutes have been employed in
varying degrees by the various courts in arriving at the same decision.
The appellate courts of Florida have never been presented the
issue of whether a person previously convicted of perjury is disqualified to be a witness in his own behalf in a criminal case. The 1957
case involved a civil action in Florida, and the perjury conviction was
in another state; consequently, this decision is not determinative of
such an issue. Of significance, however, is the observation that the
court in this case clearly implied that in the foreign cases discussed no
distinction had been drawn between civil and criminal cases and that
had the prior conviction for perjury been in the state of the forum, the
person would be disqualified as a wituess regardless of the nature of
the case. If this conclusion is accurate, it should be nullified by legislation.
It may be of significance that of the situations discussed in the
1957 opinion as prevailing in several states, the Florida Supreme
Court devoted more space to that of New York than any other, a state
in which the disqualification has been completely abolished by legislation. 117 The court expressed no preference concerning the desirability
of the legislative policy involved. Such an expression probably would
not be considered as appropriate by the court in a case in which, as
here, the statute was not applicable. Even a casual reading of the
opinion, however, reveals the advantageous position a state with no
disqualification holds in comparison to Florida.
The disqualification statute of Florida cannot be supported upon
the theory that a conviction of perjury forever destroys an individual's
credibility as a witness. The fact that the Florida Supreme Court has
held the statute inapplicable to a perjury conviction in another state
or in the federal courts is amply illustrative of this position. To argue
that perjury convictions in the courts of this state constitute a sufficient basis for the ludicrous severity of this statute is to argue for the
retention of an anomaly in a branch of the law that has been charac116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
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terized by enlightenment in the field of penalties. 118 In addition, to
contend that such a penalty deters the commission of perjury and
therefore is a justification for the statute is to ignore the practicalities
of civil and criminal litigation, a fact well known even to a mere
observer of the judicial scene.
More than casual reflection seems to be justified with reference to
what the attitude of the Supreme Court of the United States would be
concerning a state's prohibition of a person on trial for a capital crime
from testifying in his own behalf. A court that considers the guarantee of counsel as one of the fundamental rights essential to a fair trial
as accorded by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment"19
should not find it prohibitively difficult to construe that same clause as
including as an inalienable right the offering of testimony by a witness
in his own behalf. There is no doubt regarding reaction of the public
with reference to such a prohibition. The use of such an extreme situation should not be necessary to illustrate the undesirability of this
statute.
Although a distinction of degree may be drawn between the situations of a convicted perjurer's testifying in his own behalf and his testifying in behalf of another, that degree is not sufficiently great to
warrant the elimination of the prohibition of the former and the retention of the latter. Cases could reasonably be anticipated in which
there would be greater injustice perpetrated by disallowing his testimony in behalf of another person than in behalf of himself. Section
90.07 should be repealed, and the statute, section 90.08, allowing evidence of the conviction of crime to be given as possibly affecting the
credibility of the witness, should be amended to eliminate perjury as
the exception.
Statutory Penalty Provisions
The legislature of Florida has seen fit to provide in some criminal
statutes that the penalties for their violation shall be ascertained by
reference to other statutes.120 Such a procedure usually is ill-advised.
The possible repeal or amendment of the statute to which reference is
made, and the ensuing confusion created thereby, are eventualities
justifying the avoidance of such a method of specifying criminal penalties.
Intriguing situations sometimes are created by this system of reference. An apt illustration is found in the subornation of perjury statute, the penalty provision of which is stated in the following manner:
118. E.g., FLA. STAT. cs. 948, 949, §§921.17-.23 (1961).
119. Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
120. FLA. STAT. ch. 812 (1961).
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".. . shall be punished in the same manner as for perjury."12 1 The
question of which perjury statute is the object of the reference immediately is posed. If it is assumed that the proper statute to be used in
determining the penalty for subornation of perjury is the statute violated by the person procured to commit perjury, and this seems to be a
logical assumption, a somewhat ludicrous situation may arise. While
the general perjury statutes in Florida are felony statutes, 122 the violations of some perjury statutes, dealing with particular situations, constitute misdemeanors only. Consequently, in conformity with the
aforementioned assumption, if one person procures another to violate
one of the latter statutes both the suborner and the perjurer are guilty
of misdemeanors, but if the one solicited to commit the perjury refuses, the person soliciting or inciting the other to commit the perjury
thereby commits a felony, since the penalty in the latter situation is
specifically covered by another statute. 1 23 An undesirable contradiction is thus created. The solicitor's successful effort to victimize another person into criminality constitutes a misdemeanor; by failing in
his purpose he commits a felony-a cynical approach to the truism,
"It pays to succeed."
2
The Sentence

4

Indeterminate Sentence. The indeterminate sentence law was enacted in 1957,125 and thereby a significantly progressive step was taken
toward the rehabilitation of persons convicted of crime. Under this
law'1 2 a court, within its discretion, is authorized to impose a sentence

of imprisonment upon a person convicted of a non-capital felony for
an indeterminate period of six months to a period not to exceed the
maximum authorized by law for the felony of which he was convicted.
The parole commission then has the authority to terminate the sentence at any time within this period upon the recommendation of the
classification board of the Division of Corrections and the determination of the commission that justice and the public welfare will be
served.

1 27

The indeterminate sentence law contributes substantially to an enlightened system of penology. It takes into account the inability of
121. FA. STAT. §837.03 (1961).
122. FLA. STAT. §§837.01, .02 (1961).
123. FLA. STAT. §837.04 (1961).
124. See Note, Judgment and Sentence in a Florida Criminal Case, in this
Symposium.

125. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-366, at 824; FLA.
126. FLA.STAT. §921.18 (1961).
127. FLA. STAT. §921.21 (1961).
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the most able and conscientious judge to impose a sentence that is of a
duration that will best serve society and the rehabilitation of the prisoner. 128 It contemplates a competent authority that carefully observes
the prisoner during his period of incarceration and is in the best possible position to determine the most advantageous time for the termination of the sentence.
From all accounts this method of imposing and serving a sentence
has worked well in Florida. Only one glaring weakness is apparent.
Its use lies solely within the discretion of the trial court. This aspect
of the system probably was born of a legislative desire to make the
law acceptable to all concerned at the time it was enacted. Its continued retention, however, is not justifiable. Lack of uniformity and
resultant injustice in criminal sentences are inherent in such retention.
The use of the indeterminate sentence should be mandatory.
Maximum Length of Suspended Sentence. In 1957 the Florida
legislature enacted a statute1 29 providing that when a sentence has
been withheld and has not been altered for a period of five years, the
defendant shall not be sentenced for conviction of the same crime. At
the time of the enactment of this statute and for many years prior
thereto, a common practice of the trial courts was to defer the passing
of sentence from day-to-day and from term-to-term, a practice which
30
amounted to an indefinite suspension of the imposition of sentence.
This procedure was accorded appellate judicial approval upon several
occasions, 1 31 in spite of the inherent injustice residing therein. Illustrative of such injustice were Brill v. State,' 32 wherein the order suspending imposition of sentence was revoked more than seven years
after it was made and a sentence of six months imprisonment imposed,
and Moutos v. State, 33 in which a sentence was imposed after having
been suspended for ten years. Undoubtedly the legislative intent
underlying the passage of the 1957 legislation was to curb this type of
judicial practice.
During the following year, 1958, a belated but welcome and highly
128. The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized that a sentence, although
legal in every respect, may be so severe as to warrant action by the proper
administrative agency. Lipford v. State, 58 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1951). See Fox,
What is a Crime?, in this Symposium discussing the present emphasis in penology

on the offender.
129. FLA. STAT. §775.14 (1961).
130. Bateh v. State, 101 So. 2d 869 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
131. E.g., Collingsworth v. Mayo, 77 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1955); Pinkney v.
State, 160 Fla. 884, 37 So. 2d 157 (1948); Bronson v. State, 188 Fla. 188, 3
So. 2d 873 (1941); Carnagio v. State, 106 Fla. 209, 143 So. 164 (1932).
132. 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607 (1947).
183. 49 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1950).
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appropriate decision was rendered by the First District Court of Appeal of Florida in Bateh v. State,1 34 whereby the practice of indefinite
deferment of sentence was condemned as illegal. The court observed
that an order suspending the imposition of sentence indefinitely had
become a matter of common practice among the trial courts of Florida
without common law or statutory sanction and had been given appellate judicial approval without due consideration of its legal authorization. Such a practice was not deemed an inherent power of a trial
court and was inconsistent with the law of Florida vesting the lawmaking authority in the legislative branch of the government and the
power to pardon in the executive branch. It also had the effect of
nullifying the law providing for the sentence, as well as the law governing probation. For these reasons the court held an order providing
for the suspension of the imposition of sentence, other than for mere
temporary purposes, was a nullity. In addition, the court required
that the suspension of the imposition of sentence for other than temporary purposes must be followed immediately by an order placing the
defendant on probation in compliance with the requirements of the
probation statutes of Florida. 3 5 A few months after this decision of
the district court the Supreme Court of Florida accorded it unqualified approval in Helton v. State.136
In reaching these decisions the district court and the Supreme
Court briefly considered the significance of a 1957 statute permitting a
maximum period of five years for a deferred sentence. The district
court stated that the act certainly was not a legislative recognition of
an inherent power of a trial court to suspend imposition of sentence
indefinitely, nor was it a legislative grant of the power to suspend
imposition of sentence without restriction. Both courts felt that the
statute should be applicable to sentences withheld for judicial purposes of a proper temporary nature and, as the Supreme Court stated,
to sentences withheld illegally in contravention of the probation
7
law.'3
In spite of these commendable attempts of both appellate courts
to reconcile the 1957 legislation with the 1958 decisions, little was
accomplished except construction of doubts. By way of illustrating
appropriate temporary purposes for which a sentence could be suspended, the district court mentioned the determination of motions,
the pendency of other charges, and the acquisition of the information
necessary for the imposition of a just sentence. 138
134. Supra note 180.
135. FLA. STAT. ch. 948 (1961).
136. 106 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1958).

137.

FLA. STAT.

ch. 948 (1961).

138. Bateh v. State, supra note 130.
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Both the district court and the Supreme Court recognized that probation must be granted to a defendant following the suspension of the
imposition of sentence, except as to suspensions for temporary purposes. Insurmountable obstacles arise regardless of how the 1957 statute is treated in conjunction with the probation law. If the five-year
limitation statute is treated as empowering a trial court to suspend the
imposition of sentence for a maximum period of five years without
issuing an order of probation, the practical matter of the defendant's
whereabouts during the period must be considered. To keep him in
prison for any appreciable length of time, under the purported authority of the statute, would probably be subject to attack on constitutional
grounds of deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Consequently, the more likely procedure of the trial court would be that
which was commonly in vogue when the statute was passed, that of
allowing the defendant to enjoy a period of unsupervised freedom.
The judicial position adopted by the Supreme Court in 1958 to the
effect that the suspension of the imposition of sentence can be exercised by a trial judge only under the provisions of the probation law,
subject to exceptions for temporary purposes, can hardly be considered as consonant with allowing the defendant such unsupervised freedom. The only legally recognized supervision is that required of the
Florida Parole Commission in pursuance of an order of probation.'8 9
It becomes obvious, therefore, that an extensive period of freedom
possible under the 1957 statute violates the probation law. There
seems to be no possibility of reconciling these two phases of the statutory law by assuming that the 1957 enactment may be considered as a
limitation on the law of probation. If this were the case, no probationary period could run beyond a period of five years. Such a requirement would be in direct conflict with the statutory provision in the
probation law to the effect that the period of probation shall not extend more than two years beyond the maximum term for which the
defendant could have been sentenced. 140 Neither the district court
nor the Supreme Court seemed to contemplate that the five-year
limit on deferred sentences affected in any way the law of probation,
in spite of irreconcilable aspects of the two phases of the law which
were not in issue before the courts in the particular cases involved.
The 1957 statute apparently was devised for the very desirable
purpose of eliminating the unconscionable situation of a sentence being imposed after a long period of unsupervised freedom. It would
have served the state well had the legal atmosphere calling for its
creation continued to exist. This atmosphere, however, was dissipated
139. FLA.

STAT.

§948.01(4) (1961).

140. MA.STAT. §948.04 (1961).
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the next year by judicial decision, and the continued existence of the
statute can lead to nothing but complications. The statute should be
repealed.
To the legislative mind that is more receptive to suggestions for
enacting rather than repealing statutes, the area of the suspended
sentence also bears fruit. The temporary nature of the judicial purpose which justifies the suspension of the imposition of sentence without being followed by an order of probation should have a terminal
point set by statute. A person who has been convicted of an offense,
whether he is in prison pending imposition of sentence or at liberty, is
entitled to know when a trial court no longer has the power to sentence him. This principle has been recognized by the Supreme Court
of Florida. 41 In the absence of a limitation statute, the court has specified that this terminal date is coterminous with the date of the
maximum period of imprisonment possible under the violated statute.

42

This solution is the court's best, but the legislature of Florida is

in a better position to facilitate justice. A statute should be enacted
providing that a defendant whose sentence has been suspended and
who has not been placed on probation within one year of the date of
the finding of guilt shall suffer no sentence for the offense of which he
was found guilty, unless the excessive delay is caused by the intentional act of the defendant.
Court Costs and the Convicted Defendant
The burden of court costs has produced an interesting and somewhat disconcerting situation in Florida. By constitutional' 4 3 and statutory provisions' 4 4 acquitted defendants are not to be subjected to such
costs. An exception is recognized when the acquitted defendant in a
circuit court or criminal court of record calls more than his statutory
quota of witnesses to establish the same fact. In this isolated situation he must bear the expense incurred in producing the excess
5
41
witnesses.
The solvent convicted defendant is not the subject of such legislative consideration. By the express statutory provision the costs of
prosecution resulting in conviction shall be included and entered in
the judgment and rendered against the convicted person.' 46 The only
141. Helton v. State, 106 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1958).
142. Ibid.
143. FLA. CoNsr. Deal. of Rights, §14.
144. FLA. STAT. §939.06 (1961).
145. FLA. STAT. §989.07 (1961), Jackson County v. Stewart, 73 Fla. 1060,
75 So. 543 (1917).
146.

FLA. STAT.

§939.01 (1961); see generally FRLA.

STAT.

§§921.14, .15,

951.15, .16 (1961).
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exception recognized in the written law is the insolvent defendant.147
In spite of this apparent legislative mandate to the judiciary, the
solvent convict is the object of unauthorized judicial largesse in some
sections of Florida. In these parts of the state the trial courts have
assumed the practice of assessing to the county the court costs incurred in convicting a solvent defendant. Such a procedure may
appear judicially convenient or administratively expedient, but neither of these can serve to invalidate the command of the statute.
There is little doubt that the court procedure relative to costs of
prosecuting criminal cases is a subject that properly lies within the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court of Florida. 48 An appropriate rule directing a uniform practice in this area of criminal procedure
should supplant the statutes rendered impotent by practice.

APPEALS

Statutes Superseded by Appellate Rules
By an amendment to the Constitution of Florida on November 6,
1956,149 the Supreme Court was authorized to govern practice and procedure in all Florida courts, civil and criminal, by court rule. In pursuance of this authority the court promulgated the Florida Appellate
Rules, effective July 1, 1957.
In the criminal area, prior to the promulgation of these rules,
appellate procedure was governed by statute.110 Naturally, many of
these statutes were superseded by the rules, but in recognition of the
fact that in some respects the coverage of the rules was not as broad
as the statutes, the court specified that all statutes not superseded by
nor in conflict with the rules should remain in effect as rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.151 This specification pinpoints a difficulty in the appellate practice.
Chapter 924 is concerned exclusively with appeals in criminal
cases. While some of the sections contained therein are not strictly
procedure statutes, 52 many of them definitely fall within this classification. Chapter 932 also contains some statutes of the same category.
All of these laws, with minor exceptions, were on the statute books
long before the adoption of the appellate rules. A comparison of the
rules with the statutes reveals clearly that some of the statutes are in
147. FLA. CoNST. art. XVI, §9.
148. FLA. CONST. art. V, §3.

149. Ibid.
150. FL.A. STAT. ch. 924, §§932.52, .521 (1961).
1.4.
T.
151. FLA. App.

152. E.g.,

FLA. SrAT.

§924.07 (1961).
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conflict with the rules, either entirely or partially. Others present fine
problems calling for authoritative decision concerning whether con153
flicts exist.
In spite of the procedural confusion that emanates from allowing
many of these statutes to remain on the statute books, not a single
appellate criminal procedure statute has been repealed since the advent of the appellate rules. The continuation of this state of affairs is
indefensible. In this instance the Supreme Court must assume the
responsibility of the initial move to improve the law. Within this
body lies the authority to designate the statutory enactments at variance with the rules. Once this is done the cooperation of the legislature should not prove difficult to obtain in repealing these statutes.
Members of the Supreme Court are well aware of the difficulties
encountered in years past in efforts to educate the legislature and the
public to the point of accepting the court as the proper rule-making
authority for the practice and procedure to be followed in the courts
of this state. The court should bend its efforts not only toward facilitating the repeal of obsolete procedural statutes, but also attempt to
cover the entire area of court practice and procedure as soon as it is
feasible to do so.' 54
Judicial persistence in the recognition of court rules existing in
statutory form contributes to an increasing role of legislative vagaries
in this technical field of the administration of justice. The capacity
for meritorious achievement in establishing appellate criminal procedure is not limited to the judiciary, of course, but the confinement of
the responsibility for this important task to one body is highly desirable. Prior experience in Florida clearly establishes this fact. A recent illustration is found in the legislature's amendment in 1959 of
section 924.09, a statute that apparently was superseded in 1957 by
Appellate Rule 6.2.
The following table has been prepared indicating the writer's conception of the effect of the Florida Appellate Rules on pertinent statutes. The employment of such a table by the Supreme Court, with
necessary modifications and additions, probably would be of benefit to
the legislature of Florida in seeking to remove these statutory stumbling blocks that now impede judicial progress.

153. E.g., FLA.STAT. §932.52(12) (1961).
154. A major project of the Florida Bar during 1963-1964 is the preparation
of a set of rules of criminal procedure for the trial level, to be submitted for
the consideration of, and possible adoption by, the Supreme Court of Florida.

37 FLA. BJ. 280 (1963).
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Statute
924.01
924.02-924.07
924.08
924.09

924.10
924.11(1)
924.11(2)
924.11(3)
924.12
924.13
924.14
924.15
924.16
924.17-924.19
924.20
924.21-924.22
924.23
924.24
924.25(1)
924.25(2)
924.25(3)
924.25(4)
924.25(5)
924.25(6)

Superseded by Rule
Superseded by Rule Statute
6.10(a)
924.26(1)
3.1
None
924.26(2)
6.10(b)
2.1(a) (5)
924.27
6.9(a); 6.10(a)
6.2 until 1959
None
924.28
amendment of
924.29
6.13
statute; status
924.80
6.14
now doubtful
924.31
6.12
6.3
924.32
6.16(a), (b)
924.33-924.38
None
6.4
924.39
6.7(a), (e), (f)
6.17
924.40
6.7(g)
1.1; 7.2(c), (g)
932.52(1)*
None
6.5
932.52(2)
6.2
6.6(a), (b)
932.52(8)
6.7(a)
None
932.52(4)-(5)
None
7.2(c)
932.52(6)
6.15
6.7
932.52(7)
None
6.8; 7(g)
932.52(8)
6.13 is pertinent
6.7(f)
932.52(9)
None
6.9(c)
932.52(10)
6.8
6.9(b)
932.52(11)
6.8
6.9(b)
032.52(12)-(14) None
6.9(a), (b)
932.52(15)
6,9(c)
6.1
932.52(16)
6.9(d)
7.2(c)
6.9(e)
932.52(17)
None
932.521(1)-(2) None
6.9(a)
6.9(f)

*The sections above in Chapter 932 deal with appeals from municipal courts
to circuit courts. Appellate Rule 4.7 provides for dispensing with or modification
by the circuit court of any of the steps to be taken after the filing of the notice
of appeal or the institution of the proceedings for review. This can be accomplished only upon motion showing the need therefor, and notice and hearing
thereon.

POST-CONVIcON PROCESSES
Supreme Court Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1

Gideon v. Wainwright""' had repercussions in Florida other than
the establishment of the public defender system that was discussed in
the "Introduction" of this article. When the Supreme Court of the
United States supplemented an indigent defendant's right to court-

appointed counsel in capital cases by reversing its prior position' 56 and
holding that due process of law required similar assistance in prosecu-

tions for other crimes, Florida courts immediately felt the effects. The
floodgates were opened for petitions for writs of habeas corpus from
155. 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
156. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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prisoners who had not been represented by counsel in the proceedings
leading to their convictions.
Gideon apparently gave no right to a prisoner who was financially
able to retain defense counsel in the prior proceedings since he was
not entitled to court-appointed assistance, nor to indigent defendants
who competently waived the offer of representation. Regardless of
these restrictive aspects of the decision, the number of petitions filed
with the Supreme Court of Florida within two weeks following Gideon
presaged an unhealthy situation in the courts authorized under Florida law to issue writs of habeas corpus.
In anticipation of an increase of the number of these petitions directed to the supreme, district and circuit courts, with its resultant
slowdown of the judicial machinery, the Supreme Court of Florida, on
April 1, 1963, adopted Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1.
In brief, the Rule prescribes a new method of collateral attack
upon the sentence of a prisoner who is in custody by virtue of imposition of that sentence by a Florida court. Such procedure is required
to be by motion for relief to the court imposing sentence. An appeal
to the appropriate appellate court is permitted with reference to the
sentencing court's order entered on the motion. A petition for a writ
of habeas corpus is not permitted as an initial step in situations in
which a motion is appropriate. Such a petition is allowed only after
the prisoner is denied relief on his motion and is able to show that the
remedy by motion was inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention.
51 7
The Rule was copied almost verbatim from the federal statute
enacted in 1948 to provide an improvement in the distribution of the
caseload of the federal district courts. In Roy v. Wainwright'58 the
Supreme Court of Florida issued an illuminating opinion regarding
this unprecedented state measure, and the evaluation contained
therein facilitates an analysis of the new procedure. Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 apparently was promulgated in order to accomplish
two commendable objectives, (1) a more evenly distributed judicial
workload involving the proceedings falling within the scope of the
Rule, and (2) an adjudication of the rights of those involved by the
court best suited to decide the matter.15 9 In comparison to any system
devised under the pressure of pronounced necessity the apparently
successful federal pattern, with its clarifying body of court constructions, has much to commend it in the perplexing Florida situation. In
spite of this advantageous role, however, the Rule falls short of attaining the stated objectives in several respects. A discussion of these
157. 28 U.S.C. §2255 (1958).
158. 151 So. 2d 825 (1963).

159. ibid.
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alleged deficiencies will be followed by suggestions directed toward
reducing them to a minimum.
Whether the Rule is a desirable departure from past procedure
depends to a great extent on the result of a comparison of the new
"motion-for-relief" proceeding with that of habeas corpus. Although
habeas corpus remains available under the Rule, the motion for relief
is accorded a preferred status. The question of the desirability of this
preference demands attention.
Habeas corpus under present Florida law is ill-equipped to care
for the volume of cases resulting from the impact of the Gideon decision. The constitutional requirement 160 that petitions for writs of habeas corpus may be entertained only by the supreme, district, and
circuit courts, or members thereof, constitutes a limitation in which
inhere formidable obstacles to relieving either an imbalance in the
judicial workload or the designation of a more efficient forum for postconviction remedies. The relatively small number of judges facing
the monumental task, the legal permission granted to a petitioner to
submit his petition to the court or judge of his choice within the specified range, and the geographical handicaps involved, serve to emphasize the inadequacies of habeas corpus with regard to the present
situation.
The impotency of habeas corpus as a panacea does not free the
Rule from constructive criticism. The requirement that the prisoner
must file his motion for relief with the sentencing court is justified by
the Supreme Court upon the assumption that such trial court is best
equipped to adjudicate the rights of the prisoner.10 ' Action in pursuance of such an assumption not only results in a mere transfer of the
imbalance of the workload but renders the assumption itself highly
questionable.
Admittedly, the sentencing court is best equipped from the standpoints of availability of records, witnesses, and familiarity with the
locale and facts of the case. The advantages, however, lose much of
their appeal when considered with the fact that prior experience and
intimate knowledge of a case often leave deep-rooted convictions and
prejudices in the judicial mind. Such sentiments easily could result in
injustice, particularly in a proceeding the prisoner is entitled to attend
only by virtue of the exercise of the court's discretion.
In this area, experience with habeas corpus may serve to improve
the Rule. It is indeed a rare case in which a prisoner would be expected to submit a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the circuit
judge who imposed sentence upon him. It may be conceded that few
160. FLA. CONST.art. V,§§4(2), 5(3), 6(3).
161. Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So. 2d 825 (1968).
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trial courts consciously would be unfair to the prisoner, but this is not
sufficient to guarantee impartiality, nor is it sufficient to convince the
prisoner that he will fare any better on his second appearance before
the court than he did on his first. This is as true of the motion procedure as it is of habeas corpus.
1 62 that
Speedy action is another characteristic of habeas corpus
should be assured in the new proceeding. The Rule contains no express mandate for expedition, and the deference and priority with
which habeas corpus petitions have been treated can easily and unobtrusively fail to materialize in the disposition of motions for relief.
This may find particular application to prisoners at a distance from
the court and in no position to know the turn of events. The opportunity for an unjustifiable slowdown in the motion-for-relief proceedig is not lessened by the present judicial response on the trial level to
pressure for early disposition of cases brought about in large measure
by the recency of the promulgation of the Rule and the publicity
arising from the Gideon decision.
An objectionable contribution to the perpetuation of an inequitable
judicial workload is the fact that many circuit judges play little part in
the initial consideration of the motion for relief. In some of the more
populous circuits of the state, circuit judges have criminal trial jurisdiction only in capital cases; criminal courts of record have exclusive
original jurisdiction of all other felonies.' 0 3 There is a substantial number of circuit judges.' 0 4 Their potential contribution to improving the
quality of the judicial output as well as easing the burden is of such
significance that every effort should be exerted to provide for them a
substantial role in the original consideration of motions for relief.
The appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts in misdemeanor cases'0 5
should not be allowed to stand in the way of the accomplishment of
this objective relative to felonies, the classification of crimes which, no
doubt, will comprise the major portion of the workload under the Rule.
162. FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights, §7, expressly provides that habeas corpus
shall be speedily granted.
163. FLA. CONST. art. V,§§6(3), 9(2).
104 active circuit judges
164. See 36 FLA. B.f. 766-70 (1962), which lists
inFlorida. Of this number thirty-seven judges are located incircuits comprised
exclusively of counties that have criminal courts of record. These judges bear
practically no burden under the Rule, their criminal jurisdiction being limited
to capital cases. More than half the remaining circuit judges are located in
circuits in each of which is a county having a criminal court of record. These
circuit judges, by virtue of their number, bear a much lighter workload under
the Rule than do the judges of the criminal courts of record in these counties.
165. 'LA. CoNsT. art. V, §6(3), provides, inter alia, that circuit courts
shall have appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases arising in county courts, county
judges' courts, and in misdemeanor cases tried in criminal courts of record.
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The Rule is silent concerning court costs to the movant Since this
is a new proceeding, the question of costs is sure to arise. Whether
the court intended, or has the authority to so intend, that the solvent
movant 66 be free to proceed without subjecting himself to costs as
18 7 canconstitutionally guaranteed in habeas corpus proceedings
not be gathered from the Rule. Doubt also exists regarding the exact
procedure an indigent prisoner is expected to follow in seeking to file
his motion free of cost. Particularly in situations requiring hearings
involving the summoning of witnesses do these questions assume appreciable proportions.
A final comment with reference to the undesirable aspects of the
Rule may be directed to those persons who not only agree with the
foregoing observations, but who also can see nothing of sufficient
benefit in the Rule to warrant its preservation. The Rule apparently is not subject to successful attack on constitutional grounds.
Federal court construction 8 of the federal statute160 from which the
Rule was copied indicates that it is immune from attack on what appeared to be its most vulnerable aspect, that is, as an unconstitutional
infringement upon the right to a speedy grant of the writ of habeas
corpus. The federal view is that the statute merely prescribes remedial proceedings as a prerequisite to the maintenance of habeas corpus.
The foregoing discussion supports the conclusion that the Rule as
presently devised is weighted in favor of judicial convenience and to
the disadvantage of the prisoner. The following amendments appear
to be in order:
(1) All motions for relief from sentences for felonies should
be fied with the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which
the sentence was imposed.
(2) The senior judge of the circuit should assign consideration of the motion to any trial judge of the court in which the
sentence was imposed, or any trial judge of a higher court of

166. FLA. CoNsT. art. XVI, §9, provides, inter alia, that in all criminal cases
prosecuted in the name of the state when the defendant is insolvent or discharged, the legal costs and expenses shall be paid by the county in which
the crime is committed. FEA. CoNsT. Decl. of Rights, §14, provides that no
person shall pay costs except after conviction, on a final trial.
167. FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights, §7, expressly provides that habeas corpus
shall be grantable without cost.
168. Madigan v. Wells, 224 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 851
U.S. 911 (1956); United States v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 847 U.S. 902 (1954).
169. 28 U.S.C. §2255 (1958).
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criminal jurisdiction, except that in no case should the judge who
imposed the sentence receive the assignment.
(3) An appropriate statement concerning costs should be
included in the Rule.
(4) An appropriate statement concerning the priority of motions for relief should be included in the Rule.
The implementing of these suggestions in felony situations assures
full opportunity for the participation of all circuit judges, thereby more
equitably distributing the workload. Securing of the records of the
sentencing court and the summoning of witnesses would be facilitated. Finally, much of the basis for the prisoner's apprehension concerning the judge's preconceived notions would be removed.
No recommendation for change in the manner of treatment of sentences for misdemeanors is made. This is because the circuit courts
have appellate jurisdiction in misdemeanor cases.' 70 Complications
created thereby render impractical the consideration of misdemeanor
sentences in the manner recommended for felony sentences. The necessity of such a distinction has no parallel under federal law and
serves to weaken the unqualified acceptance of the federal pattern in
this state. Florida criminal procedure law, however, is replete with
71
varying treatments based on the felony-misdemeanor distinction,'
and this addition is in the interest of justice to all concerned.
Reprieves
Section 11, article IV of the constitution of Florida provides that
the Governor shall have power to grant reprieves for a period not exceeding sixty days for all offenses except in cases of impeachment.
While the maximum length of a single reprieve is sixty days, there is
no specified limit on the number of reprieves that may be granted.
Herein lies a weakness that should be eliminated from the section.
Nothing in this constitutional provision indicates that a reprieve is
anything more than a temporary suspension of the execution of the
sentence. Yet, a Governor who is so inclined may grant as many reprieves as his tenure of office will allow and remain within the letter,
if not the spirit, of the section. Many successive reprieves that have
been granted in the past have served to illustrate the glaring weakness
of this part of the constitution.
There is cast no unfavorable reflection on the chief executive of
Florida, regardless of who occupies that high office, by the suggestion
that a constitutional limit should be placed on the number of re170. See text at note 166 supra.
171. See discussion in text at notes 7-25 supra.
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prieves he is authorized to grant. Successive reprieves not only tend
to destroy the temporary nature of this mechanism of executive clemency, but also may contribute materially to injustice by infringing on
the effectiveness of a legally imposed sentence. It is recommended
that the section be amended to limit to three the number of reprieves
that the Governor, acting alone, may grant to one person with reference to the same conviction. It is further recommended that each additional reprieve may be granted only with the concurrence of a majority of the Pardon Board and such additional reprieves be limited to
three in number. At this point justice dictates that the person should
either begin service of the sentence or be dealt with by use of the
power of pardon rather than reprieve.
Probation
Maximum Length of ProbationaryPeriod. Florida law provides
that the period of probation shall not extend more than two years beyond the maximum term for which the defendant might have been
sentenced. 172 Thus, if a person is found guilty of a crime for which
the maximum period of imprisonment set by statute is five years, the
court in its discretion may order probation for seven years. Such a
latitude of authority is not justified in the light of principles that
should govern this method of reclaiming the lives of human beings for
the betterment of society.
Probation presupposes reasonable confidence on the part of the
trial court in the defendant's rehabilitative potentialities. The time
required for the realization of these potentialities has little relevance
to the maximum period for which institutional commitment may be
made. It is no secret that the penalty provisions of criminal statutes
often are the result of legislative arbitrariness, compromise, and
thoughtlessness.' 73 It is also evident that an unduly extended period
of probation may deter rather than encourage rehabilitation. Statutory penalty provisions were not devised with probation as an object
to be served; consequently, their use as a major factor in determining
the maximum probationary period may prove exceedingly detrimental
to achieving the objective sought in granting this type of conditional
freedom.
A reasonable approach to this problem is recommended by the
American Law Institute, which opines that a maximum period of five
years for felonies and two years for misdemeanors is adequate to de172.

FLA. STAT. §948.04

(1961).

173. Clark, The Significance of Penalty Provisions of the Florida Criminal
Statutes, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 289 (1956).
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termine whether probation will succeed.17 4 If a longer period is
deemed necessary in a given case, the probability of failure of probation dictates the immediate imposition of sentence rather than the use
of probation.
Implementation of the Institute's recommendation in Florida
would necessitate the amendment of the state constitution, as recommended previously in this article. Under the suggested revision the
difference between felonies and misdemeanors would be based on differences in the maximum periods of imprisonment rather than on
the place of imprisonment, as presently prevails in this state.
The principle underlying the Institutes recommendation may be
put into operation in Florida without awaiting the constitutional
change, however. A statute should be passed which sets the maximum probationary period at five years for all crimes punishable by
imprisonment in excess of five years, without regard to the felonymisdemeanor distinction. The probationary period of all crimes punishable by a lesser period of imprisonment should be set at two years.
These adjustments would improve the probation law of this state by
setting a more desirable stage for rehabilitation and by decreasing
the opportunity for abuse of the probation process.
Effect of Probation Without judgment on Recidivism Laws. In
1959 the legislature of Florida made it possible for a trial court, in its
discretion, to grant probation without first adjudicating the guilt of the
defendant.' 7 5 Presumably, an important motive behind this legislation was the desire to facilitate the rehabilitation of the probationer. 17 6
Upon an adjudication of guilt a defendant suffers a conviction,' 7 7 and
may thereby suffer the forfeiture of certain legal privileges, some of
which often are referred to as civil rights. 17 Thus, rehabilitation
may be seriously jeopardized from the beginning of the probationary
period by subjection to embarrassment and inconvenience resulting
from the loss of privileges. This innovation in the law is not without
its problems, however. Among these is its application to defendants
convicted under the recidivism laws of Florida.

174. MODEL PENAL CODE §301.2(1) (1962).
175. FLA.STAT. §948.01(1) (1961).
176, See Letter From Judge John U. Bird, 32 FLA. B.J. 528 (1958), for
the expression of a sentiment which apparently found legislative approval.

177.
178.
restored
or any

Shargaa v. State, 102 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1958).
E.g., FLA. STAT. §97.041 (1961), prohibits a person from voting until
to his civil rights if he has been convicted of bribery, perjury, larceny
infamous crime. See Note, Cfminal's Loss of Civil Rights, in this

Symposium.
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The multiple-offender and habitual-criminal laws' 79 of this state
provide increasingly severe maximum penalties for successive convictions of felonies. One of the prerequisites to a conviction in this jurisdiction is an adjudication of guilt, that is, a judgment by the court of
the guilt of the defendant.3 0 There is logic, therefore, in the argument of the subsequent offender who has suffered no adjudication of
guilt with reference to a prior offense, but has satisfactorily served
his term of probation and been released therefrom by the trial court,
that such prior offense should not be considered to be within the
scope of a repeater statute.
In spite of this logic its acceptance should be avoided. It fails
satisfactorily to explain why a person who has been treated benevolently by the law in order to facilitate his rehabilitation after his initial
slip into the avenue of criminality should be granted the right to use
that same law to the prejudice of society. If repetition of criminal activity warrants progressively severe penalties, the former probationer
who reverts to violating the criminal law should be subject to the multiple-offender statutes. These laws should be amended to this effect.
Authority of Parole Commission to Grant Probation and Conditional Releases. Section 32, article XVI of the constitution of Florida
authorizes the legislature to create a parole commission empowered
to grant paroles, probation and conditional releases to persons charged
with criminal offenses or to prisoners. The scope of such authority is
very broad and, fortunately, has been implemented by the legislature
only with reference to paroles. 1 81 This legislative restraint is more
consistent with orderly administration of criminal procedure than is
the disconcerting breadth of the constitutional authorization. A possibility remains, however, that a future legislative effort may be made
to authorize the Parole Commission to grant probation and/or conditional releases. Such a possibility deserves scrutiny.
Under Florida law probation is the procedure whereby any court
having original jurisdiction of criminal actions may withhold the imposition of sentence upon a defendant who has been found guilty of a
non-capital crime and place him under the supervision of the Florida
Parole Commission, subject to lawful conditions of such trial court.'8 2
The probationer thus is granted a restricted and supervised freedom.
Under this conception of probation the incongruous position of the
Parole Commission in attempting to initiate and administer probation
becomes apparent. The ramifications of the probation process include
179. FLA.STAT. §§775.09, .10 (1961).
180. Weathers v. State, 56 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1952).
181. FLA.STAT. ch. 947 (1961).
182. FLA. STAT. §§948.01, .011 (1961).
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an intimate knowledge of the defendant on the trial level. Scores
of potential probationers stand before trial courts daily in Florida.
Expeditious determination of the feasibility of probation in these cases
is indispensable to the operation of such a system.
The Parole Commission may, and does, assist in the probation
process. Under present law the commission serves a commendable
role in making available to trial judges, at their request, its investigatory personnel for pre-sentence investigations to aid them in determining the proper disposition of the cases of defendants under consideration for probation. 183 This assistance is of tremendous value to
many judges who have no other facilities for obtaining such helpful
information. The Parole Commission plays another important part
once the defendant is placed on probation, it being charged with the
statutory obligation to supervise all persons placed on probation. 84
The fact that the Florida legislature has seen fit to give the Parole
Commission a significant part in the probation process should be kept
in proper perspective. The valuable assistance rendered to trial
courts by the commission in the investigatory and supervisory phases
of the process in no way qualifies its three members 85 to fill a place
that only a trial court is in a position to assume. Even in the absence of
the commission's other responsibilities for parole investigations, parole supervision, 8 6 and its important part in administering the indeterminate sentence law,'8 7 its attempt to exercise the power to grant
probation as it is presently defined would approach the ludicrous. It
not only would be in a position foreign to that required of one
charged with making the decision whether to grant probation, but the
magnitude of the task would be overwhelming.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the present conception of
the term "probation" in Florida should not be infringed upon by a
constitutional authorization of the legislature to pervert it. Little fault
can be found with this conception and with the exclusive role played
by the trial court in making the initial decision which starts its operation. The authority of the legislature to empower the Parole Commission to grant probation should be eliminated from the section.
Unless the term "conditional releases" is considered to contemplate
a technical procedure distinct from either parole or probation, it can
be considered as superfluous, since both parole and probation are
conditional releases in the lay sense of the term. The Supreme Court
183. FLA. STAT. §948.02(1) (1961).
184. FLA.STAT. §948.01(3) (1961).
185. FLA.STAT. §947.01 (1961).
186. FLA.STAT.ch. 947 (1961).
187. FA.STAT.§921.21 (1961).
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of Florida, however, in discussing the possible meaning of this constitutional term, stated that a conditional release is a procedure employed in the federal system, but presently unknown to Florida practice. Under a conditional release a prisoner who has served the term
for which he was sentenced, less deductions for good behavior, is released from prison as if released on parole, subject to all provisions of
law relating to parole of United States prisoners, until the expiration
of the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced.' 8 8
If the term is to be accepted in Florida as having the same meaning as under federal law, the implementation of the constitutional authorization would lead to unfavorable results. For many years in
Florida there has been a legislatively authorized procedure of rewarding a prisoner for his good behavior in prison by deducting time from
his sentence.' 8 9 This practice is considered as contributing substantially to the rehabilitation of the prisoner. The inauguration of a procedure similar to the federal conditional release would amount to a
substitution of a parole period for a period of freedom with regard to
the time deducted from the sentence for good behavior. This probably would prove to be a step backward in the quest for rehabilitation
of the prisoner. Certainly it would be a blow to the morale of the
prison population. The term "conditional releases," therefore, should
either be defined in the constitution as signifying a specific procedure
consonant with the present law and practice in Florida or be deleted.
The elimination of the term is recommended.
Pardon
Pardon Board Membership. The membership of the Pardon
Board of Florida is comprised of the Governor, Secretary of State,
Comptroller, Attorney General, and Commissioner of Agriculture.
The board' 90 has no investigatory arm of its own with which to ascertain the merits of an application for a pardon, although it may call
upon the Florida Parole Commission to make investigations and
reports with reference to such applicationsO 1
There is no power exercised in state government which exemplifies
the authority of the sovereign over its citizens more than the power to
pardon for a criminal act. It should be wielded in an atmosphere
as free from political and other undue pressures as possible, and by a
board the personnel of which is selected primarily because of its
188. Chandler v. Johnston, 133 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1943).
189. FLA. STAT. §§944.27, 951.21 (1961).
190. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §12.
191. FLA. STAT. §947.18 (1961).
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qualifications by professional training and/or experience to best balance the interests of society and the potential pardonee.
The present system lends itself poorly to these criteria. Busy governors and cabinet members should not be required to bear the burden of administering a system of justice which plays such an insignificant part in determining the qualifications for their selection. Section
12, article IV, should be amended to provide for the appointment by
the Governor of a Pardon Board comprised of qualified private citizens selected for the primary task of wielding the power of pardon.
Statutory implementation should follow.
Pardon in Absence of Judgment of Guilt. The Florida constitution authorizes the Pardon Board to "grant pardon after conviction."19 2 A conviction requires that guilt be established by plea or verdict followed by an adjudication or judgment of guilt by the trial
court based upon the plea or verdict. 93 A sentence is not essential to a
technical conviction.'9 4

The power of the Pardon Board to grant a pardon after conviction
of a crime apparently was without complications prior to 1959. In
that year the legislature provided that an adjudication of guilt is not
indispensable to the granting of probation, leaving within the discretion of the trial court the decision as to the propriety of such adjudication., o
The foregoing legislation necessitated additional laws in order to
protect the probationer's right to appeal, since prior thereto he could
only appeal from his conviction. Accordingly, the same year, legislation was enacted to authorize the appeal of an order of probation in
the same manner and with the same scope and effect as if from a
judgment of conviction. 190
These legislative moves pose the query whether a probationer,
who has not been adjudicated guilty, and thus has not suffered a conviction in the technical sense, can be the proper subject of a pardon.
It seems paradoxical to recognize that a person may appeal a finding
of guilt of a crime to an appellate court, yet cannot legally be pardoned for such an offense. On the other hand, to warrant a pardon in
such a situation would necessitate attributing to the term "conviction"
a meaning not hitherto given to it, since for other purposes the probationer has not been convicted.
192. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §12.
193. Weathers v. State, supra note 180.
194. See FLA. STAT. §921.05 (1961).
195. FLA.STAT. §948.01(1) (1961).
196. FLA.STAT.§924.06(2) (1961).
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The enigma should be solved by amending section 12, article IV
of the constitution, to allow the Pardon Board to grant pardons either
after conviction or after the establishment of guilt of a crime by plea
or verdict.
Conditional Pardons. The Pardon Board is authorized to grant
pardons after conviction with limitations and restrictions as it may
deem proper. 19 7 This authorization clearly includes conditional as
well as unconditional or absolute pardons. 198
A conditional pardon is similar to a parole. Both entail the granting of freedom to a convicted person upon conditions to be met by
the recipient during such freedom. 199 This similarity has led to confusion in the administration of these two important phases of clemency.
The granting of a parole was not constitutionally authorized until
1940, when by amendment to the constitution the legislature was em20 0
powered to create a parole commission with power to grant paroles.
Nowhere in Florida law is the Pardon Board given authority to
grant paroles. In spite of this fact, for many years the Pardon Board
granted releases which were difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish
from paroles.201 With the creation of the Parole Commission in
1941,202 this practice apparently ceased.
In addition to different granting authorities, a parole and a conditional pardon differ in the following respects:
(1) A parole may be granted only after a part of the sentence
has been served. 20 3 It cannot be granted after the service of the
entire sentence, since a parole is essentially the serving of the
sentence under supervision outside the prison. 20 4 A conditional
pardon apparently can be granted before, during or after the
20 5
serving of the sentence.
(2) A parole does not terminate the sentence; unless revoked
it is considered as time served on the sentence.2 06 A conditional

197. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §12.
198. See Marsh v. Garwood, 65 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1958).

199. Ibid.
200. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §32; see Beal v. Mayo, 70 So. 2d 867 (Fla.
1954).
201. E.g., State v. Mayo, 131 Fla. 271, 175 So. 806 (1937).

202.

FLA.STAT.

ch. 947 (1961).

203. FIA. STAT. §947.16 (1961).
204. FLA. STAT.ch. 947 (1961).
205. Marsh v. Garwood, 65 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1958); In the Matter of the Executive Communication of the 23rd of September, 1872, 14 Fla. 318 (1872).
206. Marsh v. Garwood, supra note 205.
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pardon does not involve the serving of the sentence; the sentence
is considered as terminated unless restored because of failure to
meet the conditions upon which the pardon was granted. 20 7
(3) The meeting of the conditions of a parole by the parolee
cannot affect the length of time he is on parole;208 it merely assures
the continuation of the parole. The meeting of the conditions of
a conditional pardon may result in the ultimate consequence of a
20 9
full pardon.
(4) Assuming there is no revocation, the parole period cannot be terminated by the Parole Commission prior to the date of
the expiration of the sentence.2 10 The length of the period a person is free under a conditional pardon apparently is wholly within
2 11
the discretion of the Pardon Board.
In analyzing the similarities and differences of a parole and a conditional pardon, a common denominator is found at one point with
reference to both. A convicted person who is serving his sentence
when conditionally released from prison, either as a recipient of a conditional pardon or a parole, should be subjected to supervision in order to assure the meeting of the specified conditions. The Pardon
Board is not, and should not be, constituted so as to meet this need.
The Parole Commission is so constituted and presently maintains a
highly competent supervisory organization throughout the state. The
Pardon Board, upon occasion, has recognized its inadequacy in this
respect by granting a conditional pardon with the provision that the
pardonee be supervised by the Parole Commission. The acceptance
of such a responsibility by the Parole Commission is based solely on
its spirit of cooperation since apparently it is not legally bound to
do so; nor should it be, since a legal obligation to integrate its prodigious task of dealing with probationers and parolees 2 12 with the additional legal obligation of supervising pardonees, who are subject to
the whim and fancy of another agency, would be impractical.
Insofar as a prisoner may be conditionally released from prison,
there is an undesirable duplication of authority. This duplication
should be minimized to the extent that it is practical to do so. Section 12 of article IV should be amended to provide that in no case in
which a prisoner is eligible for consideration for parole shall he be
granted a conditional pardon.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

ibid.
§947.24 (1961).
Marsh v. Garwood, supra note 205.
FLA. STAT. §947.24 (1961).
See Chastain v. Mayo, 56 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1952).
See FLA. STAT. chs. 947, 948 (1961).
FLA. STAT.
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A prisoner is eligible for consideration for parole after serving onethird of a sentence or cumulative sentences amounting to not more
than eighteen months, or after serving six months of a sentence or cumulative sentences in excess of eighteen months, including a life sentence.21 3 Such an amendment would limit the granting of conditional pardons to convicted persons (1) prior to serving any part of
the sentence, (2) after serving the entire sentence, and (3) during
the service of that part of the sentence prior to eligibility for parole.
The Pardon Board's power to grant conditional pardons in the first
two instances should be preserved in order to care for unusual situations of a deserving nature. In the last-mentioned instance, the hiatus
between the beginning of the sentence and the date a convicted person first becomes eligible for consideration for parole creates difficulties, but not of a disastrous nature. In all three instances an adequate, legally-constituted supervisory set-up for the pardonees would
be lacking. The total number of releases in these instances, however,
probably would be small, and in the cases in which they were
granted, the Pardon Board could enlist the cooperation of the
Parole Commission in the supervisory area. This solution is preferable to eliminating the Pardon Board's power to grant conditional pardons altogether, since in these three instances such pardons conceivably could be the best possible procedure.
With reference to a convicted person who has served less than the
required part of his sentence necessary to qualify him for consideration for parole, the position might be taken that the Parole Commission's authority to grant a parole could be extended so as to eliminate
the waiting period now existing as a prerequisite to eligibility for parole. Such a move would result in the Parole Commission's supervisory capacities being legally available to all persons conditionally
released from prison. This result would be desirable, but the position
taken here is that the means do not justify the end. Florida already
is among those states having the shortest waiting period leading to
qualification for eligibility for parole consideration. A more abbreviated period or the elimination of the period would not be entitled to
public support. A proper parole process calls for mature deliberation
based upon thorough investigation. Undue pressures, either personal
in nature or by virtue of circumstances, cannot be tolerated. Thus,
the disadvantages of allowing a conditional pardon during the waiting
period appear to be of less magnitude than eliminating or abbreviating the pre-parole period.

213. FLA.

STAT.

§947.16 (1961).
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CONCLUSION

More than mere academic interest has motivated the preparation
of this article. Hopefully, it may serve as the basis for consummated
improvement in the criminal law of Florida. Efforts will be exerted in
this direction.
Herein are included six recommendations for constitutional
amendments, at least twenty suggested statutory revisions, a designation of more than fifty statutes that should be repealed as having been
rendered obsolete by statutory or court rule supersession, four statutes
ripe for repeal due to their judicially-declared unconstitutionality, two
instances of need for new court rules, two offerings for court rule
change, and four situations requiring the enactment of new statutes.
The failure to find in this account sufficient ground for a substantial contribution of a constructive nature in the criminal law area condemns the perceptive ability of the observer; the desirability of
change is not lessened thereby. This important branch of the law is
second to none in deserving more of the productive attention of the
people of Florida. May this educative device serve that end.
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